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I. INTRODUCTION
The licensing of images of world-famous idols such as Marilyn
Monroe, Groucho Marx, Humphrey Bogart, or James Dean is a buoyant
industry in Hollywood. Even though most of these stars are dead, their
images are still widely used. This is also true on the World Wide Web
(hereinafter "Web" or "WWW") where authorized web sites of stars co-
exist with rival unofficial web sites from their fans. A good example is
American Legends' (hereinafter "AL") which runs a web site with infor-
mation about a number of legendary figures, including James Dean.
AL is the defendant in a lawsuit2 filed by Curtis Management Group3
(hereinafter "CMG"), a multimillion dollar company that acts as the
agent for the estates of James Dean, Marylin Monroe, and Humphrey
Bogart, among others. CMG represents the James Dean Foundation, a
trust that claims an exclusive right of publicity over Dean and his image.
In its lawsuit, CMG alleges that the web site is an unauthorized use of
James Dean for commercial purposes. "Netizens"4 from all over the
world can order a copy of Dean's biography through the web site. CMG,
1. See American Legends (visited Mar. 26, 1997) <http:llwww.americanlegends.com>.
2. CMG Worldwide, Inc., v. American Legends et al., No. 49D109607 (Ind., Marion
County, filed Jul. 17, 1996).
3. Id.
4. "Netizen" is defined as "[a] citizen of the internet. Netizens participate in some of the
public discussions on Usenet, mailing lists, and/or IRC. Most netizens also maintain one or
more web pages. In many ways the opposite of a lurker, but even netizens lurk sometimes."
CYBERSPACE DICTIONARY (visited Mar. 26, 1997) <http://www.edmweb.comlstevel
cyberdict.html>.
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claiming to have the exclusive right of publicity over Dean's figure,
charges AL with misappropriation, defamation, unfair competition, and
conversion. "While the suit will no doubt take years to get to court, it
surely will turn into a landmark case.. .Here's hoping we don't end up
without any Dean on-line-no one wants a 'Rebel Without A Site." 5
The right of publicity protects against the unauthorized use of a per-
son's identity or persona in a way that is likely to cause harm to its com-
mercial value. Technically, all individuals have a right of publicity,
although for the most part, celebrities are the ones who invoke it. Thus,
if an on-line form of communication - such as a web site or a new-
sgroup - uses a person's identity for commercial purposes, that person
may be able to object.
An individual's right of publicity is not absolute. A person's identity
may be used in some cases, even if ostensibly for commercial purposes.
This exception is based on the right of free expression, as stated in the
First Amendment to the United States Constitution.6 To determine
whether the work is "privileged," under the First Amendment, the courts
apply a balancing test to the specific facts and circumstances. In doing
this, the courts weigh the competing interests of the individual's right of
publicity against the benefits to society from news dissemination and
free expression. News, political commentary, satire, and other communi-
cations of public interest enjoy this privileged status. This is why newspa-
pers and magazines are able to publish photographs and other personal
details without permission and without infringing upon rights of
publicity.7
The question is whether the numerous web sites, newsgroups, chat-
rooms, listservs, and trivia about famous celebrities, will be granted First
Amendment protection. The purpose of this article is to analyze how the
right of publicity applies to the on-line world of web sites, newsgroups,
and other interactive applications which use the name, likeness, or any
part of a person's identity. The thesis of this article is that most of these
uses are mainly informative, entertaining, and not commercial advertis-
ing, and thus should be protected under the First Amendment. Unless
5. Showbiz on the Web. What's New, What's brewing. YAHoo INTERNET LIFE, Oct., 1996
(visited Oct. 1996) <http://www.zdnet.com/yil/content/mag/9610/showbiz9610.html>[hereinaf-
ter Showbiz].
6. "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the
free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the
people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the government for a redress of grievances."
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
7. See generally, ONLiNE LAW 259-64 (Thomas J. Smedinghoff, ed. 1996).
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the uses are blatant commercial exploitation, they should not be deemed
infringements of the right of publicity. The countervailing right to free
speech, which limits the right of publicity, is more relevant in a medium
that constitutes the best realization ever of the First Amendment. The
current law will cover the on-line situations, but it needs to be adapted in
order to take into consideration the special nature of the Internet.
To support this thesis, Part I describes the uses of a celebrity's per-
sona on the Internet. It provides an overview of the nature of this new
medium by describing the characteristics of digital information in order
to show how traditional conceptions like space, time, property, or speech
are modified. This nature of the Internet, as an easy and accessible
means of communication, makes it the best realization of the First
Amendment.
Part II provides a historical overview of the right of publicity in the
doctrine and in the courts up to the current state of legislation. It criti-
cizes the main rationales used by the courts to justify this right as sim-
plistic and unsound. It also argues, from a socio-cultural perspective, that
the right of publicity accounts for the power of the celebrity to suppress
unwanted speech. Part III analyzes the different uses of a celebrity's
persona on the Internet, by using an analogy to the existing case law for
uses in an off-line world. Part IV suggests, from a policy perspective, that
much can be done to improve the current dispersed state of legislation.
It argues that the legislation should be unified in a Federal Statute, par-
allel to copyright regulation, and limited in the number of protected uses
of the public persona.
The article concludes by stating that the existing legal doctrine of the
right of publicity can solve most of the legal issues that might arise on-
line. This legal doctrine will work well for on-line cases, but as a matter
of policy there is much that can be done to improve the current statutory
and common law regulation. The right of publicity has been construed
too inconsistently and too broadly. Its blanket restrictions prohibit uses,
such as paraphernalia products, which are just symbolic speech that is
being restricted by the celebrity's monopoly on her public image. In an
on-line world, the right of publicity will often defer to the quasi-perfect
realization of the right to free speech. For the most part, the Internet is
just an ongoing conversation, where informational web sites, new-
sgroups, and the like, are no different than books or magazines. It is
speech in a digital media, and as such, ought to exist in an open market-
place, with few permissible restrictions by the right of publicity. After all,
the free market of ideas constitutes the ground from which so many ce-
lebrities emerge. Only those uses that implicate commercial advertising
[Vol. 8:289
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or threats to performance values should be considered infringement of
the right of publicity. Off-line law can solve most on-line issues if care-
fully adapted.
The trend started by some courts, to extend the scope of the right to
the mere evocation of celebrity through even surrounding objects, is too
far overreaching. Rather, the commercial value in a person's identity
must be kept in perspective because this is what the right of publicity
aims to promote. The digital age does bring numerous avenues for ex-
pression to those performances by non or less well-known artists. These
are the ones who lack leverage when signing contracts and thus, they are
the ones who need legislative or judicial protection based. Digital repro-
duction of an actor's movements, as intrinsic to a person as her face, will
need to be covered by the right of publicity in order to prevent unau-
thorized 'recycling' through digital animation. In this way, the right of
publicity will effectively protect those public figures and artists in a more
even way and will not further the gap between the stars and the new
talent.
II. OVERVIEW OF NET CULTURE
A. Real Uses of the Public Persona on the Internet
This section begins by showing different ways in which the image and
persona of celebrities are being used on-line. Hollywood stars, musi-
cians, models, politicians, athletes, and sports-teams have all jumped on
the Internet. They can be found not only in web sites, but also in other
forms of electronic communications such as; newsgroups, listservs, trivia-
games, and chat-rooms.8 Many of these conferences and web sites have
been set up, not by the celebrities themselves, but by their fans. "Web
sites [are] where super-fans enshrine their priestly powers, displaying
8. For the purpose of this article, we will focus on newsgroups, listservs and web sites -
including trivia games. The courts have identified six categories generally as the most com-
mon forms of communication:
(1) one-to-one messaging (such as "e-mail"),
(2) one-to-many messaging (such as "listserv"),
(3) distributed message databases (such as "USENET newsgroups"),
(4) real time communication (such as "Internet Relay Chat"),
(5) real time remote computer utilization (such as "telnet"), and
(6) remote information retrieval (such as "ftp," "gopher," and the "World Wide
Web").
Most of these methods of communication can be used to transmit text, data, computer
programs, sound, visual images (Le., pictures), and moving video images.
Am. Civ. Liberties Union, et al. v. Reno, 929 F.Supp. 824, 834 (E.D.Pa. 1996), af'd, 117 S. Ct.
2329 (1997).
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their bootlegged and autographed relics for the extended contemplation
of other admirers."9 The Net, this open and easy-to-access medium, has
made it possible for everybody to express and communicate worldwide
who their idols are. True fans learn celebrities' biographies by heart -
their works and lives- and they like to exchange views with others in-
terested in the same figures. This is simply part of human psychology:
when we have a passion for something, we talk to others about it and try
to spread the word.
With a couple of pictures, clips, or sound files, these fans set up the
coolest web sites. Are they making money? Most of them are not. Some
talented fans write their own stories about their idols. They dig so deep
that they know more facts than those already available in the public do-
main. And, what better way to offer these speech-products to the world
than through a web-site? Or to go to the folks on the 'alt.fan.' with
whom they talk every other day, and tell them that they have written the
definitive life of James Dean. Other fans feel proud of their web sites
and decide to make T-shirts with their home page stamped on them.
They will probably not make a living from this, but they enjoy the fact
that people from around the world are willing to wear their T-shirt and
share a portion of our popular culture.
There is also the detail oriented fan who likes to know every second
in the life of the rich and famous. Her next step is to organize those facts
in a data-base, connect it to the Internet and offer some free trivia game.
Other netizens will visit the site and play, try to set a record and maybe
contribute some more data with new facts about the rich and famous.
One instance of this is "[A Letterman fan] donz5@aol.com who main-
tains a massive database of 'Letterman' trivia. His mastery of 'Letter-
man' minutiae transforms him from marginal obsessive to authority
figure."'" Another way to accomplish this is through self-published
mailing lists - like the ones on Matt Drudge or Robert Seidman -
where all subscribers to the list receive the messages submitted to the list
address.
Celebrities are watching. Their consultants tell them that the web is a
good thing; it is the future and they ought to get there as soon as possi-
ble. It is possible that in the near future they will not be famous if they
are not on the Net. Persuaded by the fact that every star wants to have
9. Nathaniel Wice, Guest Column. In The Future.. .No One Will Be Famous Unless
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control of her official site, People magazine, realizing the popularity of
fan sites, began offering most searched celebrities. "(Brad Pitt, Pamela
Anderson Lee, etc.) which owed much to the fan model"" claim their
official sites as that of the magazine.
Other stars try to mingle with their fans in the newsgroups bearing
their names. In these public forums, people talk with words, images, and
sounds. It is a richer speech than that of the off-line variety, and it does
not fade away because every message is archived under subject matter.
The threads of discussion are generally publicly available to any user
with an interest in the topic. The variety of these groups is endless.
"Lurk around the personality-oriented alt newsgroups and you will
quickly learn that the quarter hour of fame Andy Warhol promised eve-
ryone is both an entitlement and a limit."'" James "Kibo" Parry inspires
his followers in alt.religion.kibology. 13 And, there is Reiko Chiba, a Jap-
anese idol singer, who lets her fans pick what outfit she should wear each
day by posting their votes. 4 "Just cruise the alt.fan hierarchy, where
mini-cults bloom and wilt with more intensity than the pop charts. Nev-
ertheless, more on-line celebrity is still fed by the off-line variety than
vice versa. The extra "channels" of the Internet stoke our appetites for
known personalities."' 5
On-line providers, like AOL, are leading the race by offering on-line
public appearances by the stars, as part of scheduled cyber talk-shows. A
memorable one was, Bridgette Hall's appearance on AOL.'6 Her publi-
cist instructed her to answer one of the thousands of messages received
from her fans.' 7 To the surprise of the worldwide audience, Hall invited
her admirer to a New York charity party.' "[T]he real 'Entertainment
Tonight' covered the story, leaving millions of TV viewers with the
vague idea that AOL is a great place to pick up supermodels."' 19
Some big record houses are betting on a cyberspace audience and
offer cybercast concerts on the Net.2" Atlantic Records, for example,
cybercasted a Hootie & the Blowfish concert from the Red Rock Arena










20. Showbiz, supra note 5.
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group's second album, which was not doing well on off-line music
charts.21
Other, more ingenious forms of exploiting the celebrity cult include
"audio-graphs" or recorded announcements by the stars that can be
purchased through a brand new web site.2' Another way is through the
electronic greeting card that features video-audio clips of both film and
television characters. The former, apparently works with the consent of
the star, while the latter is led by the infotainment23 giant, Turner, who
probably owns all of the rights "of well-known personalities, such as
Humphrey Bogart and James Dean. Download it again, Sam."'24
Some of the stars are already enjoying the fruits of their fans' labor.
Sometimes the same celebrity is featured in dozens of web sites. This
decentralized collective effort ultimately contributes to the potential
earnings of the star, more than it hurts her popularity. Evidence of this
phenomenon can be seen in the case of singer Tori Amos. This artist has
already received three platinum albums, despite the fact that her records
do not sail-up the singles charts.-' No doubt, part of her success has
come from the fact that more than seventy web sites have been launched
by her fans. "In addition, clips of some of Amos's videos can be viewed
on the Atlantic Records site for those of you who can't get enough of the
Diva of Cyberspace".26
But not all celebrities are that cybersavvy. Some get annoyed over
the content, which they cannot control, in those already existing on-line
forums. They opt for building their official web site and perhaps for
'cease and desist' letters to the unauthorized sites.
Steven Seagal is feeling 'under siege' these days. Seagal, who has
a reputation for being tough.. .with what's subsequently written
about him in the press, is said to be less than happy about the
many sites featuring material on him and his movies. So he wants
to take matters into his own hands [by] launching his own site-
which he can control more closely.27
21. Id.
22. Showbiz on the Web. What's New, What's brewing, YAHoo IrrERNEr LrFE, Sept., 1996
(visited Oct. 20, 1996) <http.:/www.zdnet.com/yil/content/mag/9609/showbiz9609.html>.
23. "Infotainment" refers to the convergence of informational media and entertainment
on the web. Anne E. Huntington & Lisa Carlson, WWWebsters Dictionary (Oct. 10, 1997)
<http://www.m-w.com/dictionary>.
24. Id.
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Another famous case is the class-action lawsuit brought by a group of
models against the on-line service CompuServe. In this case, the models
allege that the service invaded their privacy and was negligent for the
misappropriation of their likeness, for commercial benefit, which is in
violation of Section 3344 of the California Civil Code.2" Apparently
CompuServe misappropriated their images without consent for commer-
cial use, by publishing their photographs in CompuServe's "Glamour
Graphics" and "Graphics Comer" forums, and in its "California Girls"
library.29 The suit alleged that CompuServe and several other defend-
ants obtained the photographs without permission, and made the images
available to more than 4.7 million CompuServe subscribers world-
wide. ° The photos were allegedly included in areas of the service for
which CompuServe controlled the content.3 The plaintiffs also claimed
that the images had been downloaded, distributed, or reproduced by
users throughout the world in posters, advertisements, and product
packaging. 2 The plaintiffs sought compensatory and punitive damages,
attorneys fees and costs, and injunctive relief.33
In some cases it is not the star, but a trust that polices on-line activi-
ties in order to maintain the good name of a deceased celebrity. The
trust may start with threatening letters to the lay netizen, usually by a
non-lawyer, claiming the exclusive right to the persona of the star, under
something that is called, the "right of publicity." The trust urges the ne-
tizen to take down the site, newsgroup, or what have you. The netizen
does not understand. She usually knows nothing about copyrights and
does not know that the picture that she used was in the public domain.
Thus, she will usually give in to the legal threats. The most famous exam-
ple is a phenomenon started in the mid-70s by female 'Star Trek' fans
who made up a homosexual romance between Captain Kirk and Lieu-
tenant Spock.34 They used poetry, drawings and pictures.3 While the
work was considered in the academia as "one of the most fascinating
appropriations and manipulations of popular culture by women ever,"
copyright holders prompted several role-playing "multi-user dungeons"







34. Wice, supra note 9.
35. Id.
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("MUDs"), based on science fiction novels to shut down in 1994 under
the first wave of lawsuit threats.36
Those who resist the legal threats get sued for infringement of copy-
right, right of publicity, trademark, unfair competition, or similar
charges. The AL lawsuit is a good example of a completely wrong under-
standing of the web, the way it works, and the nature of the medium.
This article will proceed charge by charge in order to show the unsound-
ness of the lawsuit.
CMG alleged misappropriation of rights of publicity because AL
chose to write a biography on Dean, based on its own research. 7 CMG
controls Dean's likeness and believed that Dean would not be happy
with the book. 8 The meaning that AL gave to Dean's figure was not in
CMG's line of thinking.3 9 The interview that AL published about one of
Dean's love-affairs was simply not CMG's truth.40 On top of that, since
AL had set up its on-line 'kiosk,' using pictures which are deemed to be
copyright free, it had to pay CMG because it held the monopoly on
Dean's image and the rest of his persona for commercial purposes.41
CMG then charged AL with conversion, which is redundant with the
misappropriation of rights of publicity charge.42 The tort of misappropri-
ation "recognizes that individuals.. .have enforceable proprietary rights
in trade values they create and that invasion of these values occurs when
an unauthorized person converts them for personal use and profit".4
Another charge that was brought was that of unfair competition.'
Presumably, AL was not only getting CMG's business of selling Dean's
image, but had also dared to place a link to CMG's official Dean's web
site.41 CMG went on by alleging violations of the Lanham Act, trade-
mark infringement, dilution, and infringement of trade dress. AL had
36. Id.




41. Defendants do not have now and never had permission from the proprietor of
Dean's rights of publicity, and other associated rights, to commercially exploit his
name, image, likeness, or any other aspect of Dean's right of publicity. Likewise, de-
fendants do not now have and never had permission from CMG to use, feature or
display the CMG mark in any manner whatsoever.
CMG Worldwide, Inc., No. 49D109607 at 4.
42. David E. Shipley, Publicity Never Dies; It Just Fades Away: The Right of Publicity and
Federal Preemption, 66 CORNrELL L. REv. 673, 685-86 (1981).
43. Id., at 686.
44. CMG Worldwide, No. 49D109607.
45. Id.
[Vol. 8:289
THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY ON THE INTERNET
used both the trade name 'CMG' and the logo as part of its HTML rec-
ommended links.46 CMG incorrectly inferred that AL's intention was to
create the misconception that CMG, the true source for many stars, was
endorsing AL's site. "Defendants have misappropriated and infringed
upon such distinctive trade dress and, in so doing have violated the Lan-
ham Act... all for the purposes of furthering the sales of said book and
the promotion of defendants' other commercial activities."'47 CMG er-
roneously believed that AL would increase the hits on its page by linking
to CMG.4" This claim was completely meritless considering the way that
hypertext works. In addition, in this particular case CMG did not know
that AL's site received a Microsoft award for 'site of the week,' and
therefore, AL did not need extra help to attract more traffic to its site.
AL was lucky that it did not use frames49 in its web site. Following
CMG's rationale, it would have been more apparent to CMG that AL
was trying to deceive the visitor to CMG's site, by linking AL's site to
CMG's official site. The visitor would not even notice that she had exited
AL's site, because the frames stay, wrapping every single page where the
visitor chooses to go and the URL remains the same (in this case, <http:/
/www.americanlegends.com>). CMG would have considered this use
misleading and an infringement of its copyrighted content. It would
amount to stealing CMG's work and presenting it as AL's.
This lawsuit shows a lack of understanding of the basic nature of the
Web. The hyperlinks are the Web, which are the neurons of this nervous
system that is the WWW. The HTrP is the protocol linkage mechanism,
that lets users move around the hypertext of millions of documents.
Every site has hyperlinks to information related to the site's topic, be-
cause this is the only way to make this medium navigational. To ignore
these basic principles of the on-line medium will only lead to an errone-
ous interpretation of the law in cyberspace.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 3.
48. Id.
49. Frames are just a type of HTML command that divide up the screen in two or more
windows. One is permanent, the frame itself, and the other is the window where the user is
viewing the pages he chooses to go to. The function of the frame is to facilitate the visitor's
navigation inside a web site, acting like a menu with all the options that stays by one side of
the screen to let one choose his destination without the inconvenience of using back and for-
ward arrows. A secondary use of frames is advertising. Their permanent future makes them an
ideal spot to set ad banners without disrupting the infotainment in the main window.
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B. The First Amendment on the Internet
Commentators50 on cyberlaw generally agree that the Internet is the
best realization ever of the First Amendment. It is close to the perfect
market of ideas, where every speaker is a listener and vice versa. The
natural characteristics of the medium make its access open to anybody.
The result is a decentralized and democratic medium, where government
censorship is more difficult than ever before.
"The Internet has no parallel in the history of human communica-
tion."'" It provides millions of people around the world with a low-cost
method of conversing, publishing, and exchanging information on a vast
range of subjects with a worldwide and virtually unlimited audience. The
Internet is a "unique and wholly new medium of worldwide human
communication.""2
The medium allows "literally tens of millions of people to exchange
information. These communications can occur almost instantaneously,
and can be directed either to specific individuals, to a broader group of
people interested in a particular subject, or to the world as a whole."'53
As stated in the finding of facts in the Reno case, the first free speech
case on the Internet to reach the Supreme Court, "[it is no exaggeration
to conclude that the content on the Internet is as diverse as human
thought."54
The Internet also provides new forms of community - communities
based not necessarily on physical proximity, but on shared interests, be-
liefs, cultures, or personalities. In addition to its endless on-line content,
the Internet hosts conversations and even "'virtual communities' that
50. See Eugene Volokh, Cheap Speech and What It Will Do, 104 YALE L.J. 1805 (1995);
Cyberspace cannot intrude without affirmative conduct by a user, so the Internet's
ubiquitous character provides no justification for a departure from existing First
Amendment rules. Indeed, since unfettered access to the Internet should provide its
users with more meaningful access to the so-called 'marketplace of ideas' than has ever
been the case with more conventional media, the case for robust First Amendment
protection seems crystal clear.
See also, E. Walter Van Valkenbourg, SYMPOSIUM: INNOVATION AND THE INFORMA-
TION ENVIRONMENT. The First Amendment in Cyberspace, 75 OR. L. Rnv. 319, 324.
51. Brief of Appellees, Janet Reno, et. al., v. American Civil Liberties Union, et. al.,
(U.S. Oct., 1996) (No. 96-511).
52. Id. at 81.
53. Id. at 4.
54. Id. at 174.
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simulate social interaction."55 These new forms of community enrich
people's lives and often are followed by face-to-face encounters.56
The Reno court also found that"[t]he start-up and operating costs en-
tailed by communication on the Internet are significantly lower than
those associated with use of other forms of mass communication. '57 This
fact permits the use of the internet by individuals as well as large corpo-
rations.58 The Internet is peculiar because it is "not exclusively, or even
primarily, a means of commercial communication." 59 As Congress itself
recognized, "[t]he Internet.. .offer[s] a forum for a true diversity of polit-
ical discourse, unique opportunities for cultural development, and myr-
iad avenues for intellectual activity."'60 Thus, the Internet is a "never-
ending, worldwide conversation,"61 and as such, "[t]he Internet is a far
more speech-enhancing medium than print, the village green, or the
mails," as Judge Dalzell observed.62
In the words of Prof. Volokh,
"[T]he First Amendment of today will not only work well with the
new information order - it will work better than it ever has
before.. .The reason being that all the laws pertaining to speech
are based on some premises on how the market of ideas should
operate, sort of the ideal model to follow. The good news is that
this model appears to be closer to the electronic medium 'where
money is no barrier to speaking; where it's easy to avert eyes
from offensive speech; where there's more than one newspaper in
each town, and something other than a vast wasteland on TV."' 63
It is more likely that the new digital technology ideas will get their way,
than the print or broadcast media.
Regulations that deal with speech, like libel law, indecency, or the
right of publicity, will limit the Internet just as they limit the rest of the
media. However, "there will need to be some 'medium specific' applica-
tions of these rules on the Internet." 64 Take for instance the right of pub-
licity. This common law right is a mere legal decision that gives more
weight to the celebrity's interest in her image as opposed to society's free
55. Id.
56. HowARD RHEINGHOLD, VIRTUAL ComlIVIuNrY (1994).
57. Reno, et. al., No. 96-511, at 76.
58. Id.
59. Id. at' 75.
60. Communications Decency Act, 47 U.S.C. § 230(a)(3) (1996).
61. Reno, 929 F.Supp. at 883.
62. Id.
63. Volokh, supra note 50, at 1847.
64. Van Valkenbourg, supra note 50, at 324.
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speech interest. In cyberspace though, the initial balance is already al-
tered in favor of a stronger realized First Amendment. It should then
logically follow that there is a weaker case for the publicity rights of
individual celebrities, when considering their use on the Internet. Only
blatant commercial uses should be deemed infringement, but for the rest
of the gray area, entertainment or symbolic speech, where courts have
been so hesitant and inconsistent, the scales should fall on society's side.
The trend initiated by the most recent cases - like the Vanna White case
in the 9th Circuit- is to construe a more expansive or amorphous right
of publicity as a "one size fits all." '65 In the end, this uncertainty of what
can and cannot be published may silence speakers and thus result in a
reduction of the breadth of diversity and information that is now avail-
able on the Internet.
C. Digital Media v. Mass Media
The discussion of the existence of a right of publicity is not merely
legal. As we will see, mass communication and the entertainment indus-
try have played a major role in the actual configuration of the right of
publicity. The courts, aided by the doctrine, had to create a property
right in order to protect celebrities' interests in their images from indis-
criminate exploitation in the mass media. But, we are beginning to see a
movement by a great part of society to a digital media which is more
decentralized and more individualized than are television or radio. This
change in the distribution channels of information may alter the value
attached to a person's image, making it less influential in a more selec-
tive and dispersed audience. Consequently, innovative ways of protect-
ing individuals' interests (other than in property) may be necessary as
technology expands and our culture changes. 66
65. The California right of publicity can't possibly be limited to name and likeness. If
it were, the majority reasons, a 'clever advertising strategist' could avoid using White's
name or likeness but nevertheless remind people of her with impunity, 'effectively evis-
cerat[ing]' her rights. To prevent this 'evisceration,' the panel majority holds that the
right of publicity must extend beyond name and likeness, to any 'appropriation' of
White's 'identity'- anything that 'evoke[s]' her personality.
Vanna White v. Samsung, 989 F.2d 1512, 1514 (9th Cir. 1993) (Samsung used a robot dressed
and posed like gameshow hostess Vanna White for an advertisement of VCRs. The court
granted the mere evocation of identity to be an infringement of the right of publicity, despite
the non-deceptive imitation and parody defenses.)
66. An Assessment of the Commercial Exploitation Requirement as a Limit on the Right of
Publicity, 96 HARv. L. REv. 1703, 1714 (1983).
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Visionary Derrick de Kerckhove,67 disciple of media expert
McLuhan, suggests some of the sociological consequences of this shift
from mass-media to a digital media, like the Internet. His predictions
can give us some light as to where the Internet is leading our society and
the way in which it may alter our human interactions.
While radio and television are very powerful media, mainly because
they are invisible technologies to the audience, the Internet is not invisi-
ble to users because it requires a proactive participation. Digital technol-
ogy cannot impose its laws without overcoming some resistance from a
social body. Radio and television are and have always been a single en-
tity's agenda - a big man, a dictator, a powerful industry - whereas the
agenda of the Web is a shared one, not imposed. The Web is both collec-
tive and individual at the same time. The Internet is the only medium
where language appears orally and written down at the same time. Oral,
because it is just-in-time or part of a context where communities reor-
ganize according to need, function, and circumstance, like regular con-
versation. Written, because everything that is said is fixed and archived.
In a networked society, the power changes hands from the producer
to the consumer. The importance of broadcast media diminishes and
although broadcasters will continue, the number of alternative sources
will multiply. The role of broadcast in a digital media is to feed our need
for public references. However, the web allows us to move away from
the mass-culture approach to a fast-speed, customized culture, and to the
depth culture of the web. "Today, our identity is a point of being. To-
morrow, the self remains but identities multiply in just-in-time identities,
fabricated ones, collective identities depending on where you are."6
What all of this means for the current configuration of the right of
publicity is that a very careful application to the on-line world is re-
quired, otherwise, we will reach unsound legal conclusions. The next ex-
ample illustrates this point. The alt.fan. newsgroups are no more than
public conversations, with a richer language because they may include
pictures and sounds.6 9 The right of publicity claims to protect the image
and likeness of the celebrities from unauthorized uses. These ongoing
conversations may carry different meanings than those intended in the
first instance by the star. Moreover, since they are fixed and archived,
67. Kevin Kelly, What Would McLuhan Say?, WImD 4.10 (Oct. 1996) (visited Oct. 30,
1996) <http:lwww.wired.comlwiredl4.10/features/dekerckhove.html>.
68. Id.
69. See for example, David Futrelle, Web of Gossip: The Internet is Creating Its Own Stars
in the Realm of Dishing Dirt, Cruc. Tim., April 15, 1998, at 1.
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text and pictures can be downloaded and reproduced easily. This new
avenue of communication is viewed with resentment from the celebrity,
the result being threatening letters that will force the newsgroup to shut
off this Big Conversation, 70 without getting alternative ways of expres-
sion. The First Amendment has been abridged just as if a group of fans
were forced to silence their weekly reunion. Both are conversations, car-
rying free speech, with the only difference that one uses air waves and
the other, digital bits.
D. Digital Right of Publicity
Over the years, the courts have found it hard to recognize a right of
publicity in the celebrity's persona. The reason being that the public im-
age is not something that could be exclusively owned or controlled. The
celebrities' public image results from a collective meaning. The public
image is a shared base of immaterial information, so to speak. By creat-
ing a right of publicity over the commercial use of this information, the
celebrity is given a limited monopoly. The non-commercial or informa-
tive uses remain outside the celebrity's monopolistic right.
Some authors, like JP Barlow, have noted that in a digital medium,
the nature and value of information are altered somehow. 71 Thus, they
advocate a major change in the regulation of intellectual property, such
as copyright.72 Given the intellectual nature of the right of publicity, and
its characterization as information, it would be sensible to apply those
same characteristics to the right when used in a digital medium. This
process will teach something about the value of public images on-line.
As Barlow and other authors point out:
1. "[I]nformation is obviously not a thing. Information is something
that happens in the field of interaction between minds or objects or
other pieces of information."73 The name, the fame, or the public
image of the celebrities is born through a collective meaning. It is
through these interactions that the public persona of individuals is
elevated from the mass of society.
2. "Information is experienced, not possessed. The central economic
distinction between information and physical property is that infor-
mation can be transferred without leaving the possession of the orig-
70. "Big Conversation" expresses the idea that the internet is a worldwide conversation
and the most participatory medium of expression ever developed. Reno, No. 96-511.
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inal owner."'7 4 The image of Madonna can be experienced or shared
in many ways (movies, T-shirts, posters) by millions of fans around
the world without the star losing her identity.
3. "Information wants to change. The stories which once shaped our
sense of the world did not have authoritative versions. They adapted
to each culture in which they found themselves being told."' James
Dean was the rebel without a cause for young generations in the
fifties. Today, James Dean provides alt.lesbians newsgroup "with an
icon which may embody a challenge to dominant understandings of
the causal connections between biology, anatomy, desire, and sexual
practice." 76
4. "Information is perishable. Its quality degrades rapidly both over
time and in distance from the source of production. '77 The original
performance, the live appearance, the original picture will be the
most valuable pieces of information. From then on, subsequent re-
productions will gradually lose value at a much faster rate.
5. "With physical goods, there is a direct correlation between scarcity
and value. Familiarity is an important asset in the world of informa-
tion. ' 78 The right of publicity gives a monopoly to the celebrity.
However, its on-line value is proportional to its dissemination, as
opposed to its value increasing due to limited distribution. The de-
centralized character of the Internet makes it tougher for stars to
maintain their same level of stardom, because they have to multiply
their efforts. Andy Warhol's fifteen minutes of fame will approxi-
mate to almost zero.
6. The conversation that goes on in the Internet about celebrities, is
mainly a collective work that fills the archives, newsgroups, web
sites, and databases of the Internet. It is "[i]nformation as its own
reward. ,79
Celebrities will still be able to profit from this flow of information.
Official sites, endorsements, live appearances, and real-time perform-
ances will constitute the fresh information coming from the living source.
As J.P. Barlow puts it, "[ilt will be a matter of defining the ticket, the
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Michael Madow, Private Ownership of Public Image: Popular Culture and Publicity
Rights, 81 CAL. L. REv. 125, 143 (1993); citing Rosemary J. Coombe, Objects of Property and
Subjects of Politics: Intellectual Property Laws and Democratic Dialogue, 69 TEx. L. REv. 1853
(1991).




MARQUETTE SPORTS LAW JOURNAL
venue, the performer, and the identity of the ticket holder, definitions
which I believe will take their forms from technology, not law. In most
cases, the defining technology will be cryptography."' 0 Thus, a property
right, as configured today, might lose its relevance, as new ways (tech-
nology mainly) to protect the value attached to public figures arise.
The basic concepts from the physical world like time, space, speech,
or information acquire new dimensions in the on-line world such as in-
stantaneous and borderless communication where multimedia and bits
are the key words. The solution then, to protect the celebrity's persona,
may not be a property right, but may center on a technological advance.
The problem is that some of this technology is coming, although it is not
yet here. Lawmakers and courts need to envision where this whole in-
dustry is going. If not, they will come up with more and more restrictive
laws like the CDA or decisions like the Vanna White case which will
make it more difficult for a gradual transition to a more deregulated and
technology-controlled medium.
III. OvERviEw OF THi RIGHT OF PUBLICITY
This section explores the history of the right of publicity, the ratio-
nales given by the courts to justify the right, and the framework of the
current regulations. The conclusion offers a sociological perspective of
what this right ultimately means to popular culture.
The right of publicity is the right of each individual to control and
profit from the value of his or her name, image, likeness, and other indi-
cia of identity.8' For the most part, only celebrities generate significant
economic value from this right. First, they receive an income through all
of the demand for information on their lives and doings - news, gossip,
biographies, interviews, docudramas. Second, paraphernalia such as T-
shirts, posters, greeting cards, buttons, coffee mugs, etc., bearing the fa-
mous, has become very popular. Third, advertising of collateral products
has become a very profitable activity. Brand names are willing to pay
considerable amounts of money to celebrities because they will gain im-
portant returns.8" That is not the case in the sale of paraphernalia where
the returns are marginal and where the economic rationale of the right
of publicity for 'pay per view/use' is not yet clear.83
80. Id.
81. See generally J. THOMAS MccARTHY, THE RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY
(1992). But see Madow, supra note 76 (a thoughtful criticism of the right of publicity).
82. MCCARTHY, supra note 81, § 4.1 [D], at 4-8.
83. See generally note 157.
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Courts have long protected the pecuniary value of a person's identity
under a number of legal theories.' Legal order could assign all of these
economic values to the same entity, either to the individual celebrity her-
self or to the public domain. A middle ground was adopted where the
celebrity could get back, in a sort of monopoly, a part of the economic
gains for some of the uses of her identity, but not all of them. 5 Thus,
merchandising and advertising values that attach to star images have
been construed as her private property and part of her right of publicity.
But, a celebrity's persona may be freely appropriated for what are
deemed to be primarily "informational" and "entertainment" pur-
poses.86 News reports, novels, plays, films, and biographies are all per-
mitted uses, with neither authorization nor payment requirements in
most cases.8 7 Exceptions to this rule are the taking of a performance or
the use of a look-alike/sound-alike.8 8
Though the right of publicity is available to all individuals, right of
publicity actions generally involve celebrities since there is little pecuni-
ary gain in appropriating the name and likeness of an unknown individ-
ual. Doctrinally, the right of publicity has evolved from a type of privacy
interest into a legal mixture of the tort of misappropriation, unfair com-
petition law, and property jurisprudence.
A. History of the Right
The turn of the nineteenth century brought the image revolution with
new techniques like photography. The press benefited profoundly from
these changes. Advertising and journalism in general added pictures to
the traditional text-only based publications. Famous people, who were
known only by their names, saw their pictures distributed everywhere. 9
As a result, some felt that their privacy had been invaded and brought
their cases to the courts. At about the same time this was occurring
(1890), Warren and Brandeis wrote their article9" in support for a legal
right of privacy as defense, for a celebrity, against an unstoppable press.
84. See Fred M. Weiler, The Right of Publicity Gone Wrong: A Case For Privileged Ap-
propriation of Identity, 13 CADozo ARTs & Er IJ 223 (1994).




89. See Madow, supra note 76, for a detailed account of the history of the right of
publicity.
90. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARv. L. REv. 193
(1890).
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The right of privacy was first recognized in cases of unauthorized ad-
vertising of names and likeness. For example, the Roberson and
Pavesish9a cases involved the interests in anonymity, autonomy, and rep-
utation. The former, was brought by a minor whose picture had been
used in an advertisement for flour.92 The latter involved the use of an
artist's photo in a testimonial advertisement for life insurance. 93 This un-
authorized commercial exploitation of one's name or likeness became
widely recognized as part of the right of privacy.
Later, the technology evolution brought the radio and the movies.
With them was born a new social phenomenon, the celebrity. Fame was
more a question of attractive personality rather than merit. The power of
this media made audiences lose their minds over these new stars. The
press took advantage of this public interest and started to cover the pri-
vate lives of the stars. It was the 20s and 30s, when Hollywood also dis-
covered the lucrative business of exploiting the star's image through
people's emulation and consumption of these idols.94
During the 40s, celebrities gained leverage in negotiations which per-
mitted them to recover control over their commercial exploitation.95
During the next two decades, celebrities from the sports and entertain-
ment industries managed the exploitation of their likenesses, which
sometimes involved litigation in order to prevent unauthorized uses.96
However, the lawsuits were brought under defamation, unfair competi-
tion, trademark infringement, or right of privacy claims. 97 Right of pri-
vacy claims were difficult to prevail on, since the courts reasoned that
celebrities had entered the public eye voluntarily. 98 Even when they suc-
ceeded in their claims, the damage awards were nominal.99 They usually
were awarded offensive damages, but were not awarded commercial
damages for misappropriation of their image.100 Furthermore, the right
of privacy was neither assignable nor descendible.10'
91. Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 64 N.E. 442 (N.Y. 1902); Pavesich v. New
England Life Ins. Co., 50 S.E. 68 (Ga. 1905).
92. Roberson, 64 N.E. 442.
93. Pavesich, 50 S.E. 68.
94. Madow, supra note 76, at 158-164.
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The only legal solution, in order to maximize this commercial value,
was to create a property right in the celebrity's image. The celebrity
would then be able to ban unauthorized uses of her image, authorize
uses if paid for, and assign uses after death. This type of property recog-
nition first came about in 1935 in the case of Hanna Manufacturing Co v.
Hillerich & Bradsbury Co.'°2
It was not until 1953 that the right was first named "right of public-
ity" by Judge Frank in Haelen Laboratories Inc v Topps Chewing Gum,
Inc.1 3 However, the Court did not categorize this right as property, and
it did not offer any rationale for the new right. It simply recognized a
preexisting commercial practice and admitted that without this right, ce-
lebrities could not get monetary compensation for their persona and thus
"feel sorely deprived.' 10 4
A year after Haelan, Melville Nimmer published an article on the
right of publicity10 5 which had a strong resonance, similar to that which
Warren and Brandeis had on the right of privacy. Nimmer acknowledged
the deficient protection of celebrities' commercial values through the ex-
isting legal theories. 0 6 He concluded that there needed to be a property-
like right of publicity. 07 This right would be actionable for unauthorized
use of one's persona, no matter whether it was offensive to the person. 108
The damages would be estimated in terms of the monetary value of the
102. Hanna Mfg. Co. v. Hillerich & Bradsby Co., 78 F. 2d 763 (5th Cir.), cert denied, 296
U.S. 645 (1935). (Plaintiffs contracted with certain famous baseball players for the "exclusive
right" to use their names, autographs, and photographs in connection with the sale and adver-
tising of baseball bats. Plaintiffs then sued to enjoin a competing manufacturer from using the
marks, based on property rights in the marks. Reversing the district court's decision, the
court of appeals declared that "[flame is not merchandise. It would help neither sportsman-
ship nor business to uphold the sale of a famous name to the highest bidder as property." Id.
at 766. Consequently, the Fifth Circuit held that plaintiff's contracts with the players operated
only to prevent the players from objecting to its own use of their names.)
103. Haelen Laboratories Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866 (2nd Cir.), cert.
denied, 346 U.S. 816 (1953). (The defendant produced a baseball card bearing the photograph
of a baseball player who had already granted the plaintiff an exclusive license to use his pic-
ture in connection with the sale of the plaintiff's products. Rejecting the defendant's argu-
ment that the agreement between the player and the plaintiff provided the plaintiff no
enforceable rights, the Second Circuit held that New York's common law would recognize the
baseball player's assignable "right in the publicity value of his photograph." The court coined
"right of publicity" as the name of this right. In justifying recognition of the right of publicity,
the Second Circuit rejected privacy notions and focused instead on the economic value of the
public figure's identity.)
104. Id. at 868.
105. Melville Nimmer, The Right of Publicity, 19 LAW & CoNTrnIP PROBS. 203 (1954).
106. Id. at 214.
107. Id. at 216.
108. Id.
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public figure, as opposed to the injury used in right of privacy claims.' 0 9
However, the defendant could allege a public interest defense.110
In order to justify this new common law property right, Nimmer
searched for a moral rationale based on Locke's theory of property."'
He concluded that persons who have long and laboriously nurtured the
fruit of publicity values, may be deprived of them unless judicial recogni-
tion is given to their publicity right. Madow suggests that this was part of
a large campaign backed by Hollywood - Nimmer was legal counsel to
Paramount, at this time." 2 The industry wanted to convince the mass
audience that stardom is not a matter of luck, but is a matter of a celeb-
rity's hard work and "labor.""' The fact is that after Nimmer's article,
the right of publicity, was well accepted by the doctrine, but not that well
by the courts. Later justifications, like the unjust enrichment rationale,
by Prof. Kalven,"14 or the copyright incentive rationale used by the
Supreme Court in Zacchini,"5 paved the way for a full recognition of the
right.
Another landmark article was by Dean Prosser, in 1960, where he
characterized the right of privacy as four different types of invasions. The
fourth of which, appropriation of the plaintiff's name and likeness, grew
into the right of publicity." 6 The other three identified by Prosser were
intrusion upon the plaintiff's solitude, public disclosure of private facts




111. Nimmer, supra note 105, at 216.
112. Madow, supra note 76, at 174, n.238.
113. Id.
114. Harry Kalvin, Jr., Privacy in Tort Law: Were Warren and Brandeis Wrong?, 31 L. &
CoNT. PROB. 326, 331 (1966).
115. Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562, 578 (U.S. Ohio, 1977).
(Hugo Zacchini made his living through performing as a "human cannonball." When Zacchini
appeared at a county fair in Ohio, a television station's cameraman filmed his fifteen-second
act of being shot out of a cannon. Zacchini sued on right of publicity grounds after the televi-
sion station showed the film, accompanied by a reporter's favorable commentary, on its eve-
ning newscast. In a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court reversed Ohio's highest court and held
that the television station's showing of Zacchini's "entire act" could give rise to a valid right of
publicity claim in his favor. The First Amendment defense had to give way to the performer's
right of publicity.)
116. William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REv. 383, 389 (1960).
117. Id.
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It was during the 70s and 80s when case law and statutes recognizing
the right of publicity, blossomed." 8 Madow explained that this growth in
the number of these types of cases was because of the ever rising money
involved in the claims brought to the courts by celebrities." 9 There was a
bigger legal pressure on the celebrity's side versus a less organized vari-
ety of infringers, with also less lawyering and lobbying skills.120 The out-
come is a quite incoherent jurisprudence that has gradually broadened
the uses protected by the right of publicity and which varies from state to
state.' 2' Infringing acts range from appropriation of name and likeness
for use on fan-type merchandise, to the use of the image or a 'look-alike'
to endorse collateral goods. 22
One of the most controversial decisions in the later years has been
the White v. Samsung decision, handed down by the Ninth Circuit, in
1992.'1 Samsung used a robot dressed and posed like gameshow hostess
Vanna White for an advertisement of VCRs. The court granted the mere
evocation of identity to be an infringement of the right of publicity, with
the sweeping effect of including even non deceptive imitations and paro-
dies under the umbrella of the publicity right. This raised a First Amend-
ment question as to the extent of this celebrity's monopoly.124 Some
argued that this outcome is the necessary response, by the law, to the
threat that new media technologies pose to a celebrity's image.'" This
also constituted a strong countervailing interest to common free speech.
118. MccAmyR, supra note 81, § 6.1[B]. According to McCarthy, the right of publicity
has been recognized as a matter of common law in fourteen states, four of which have also
statutory provisions that protect the right. Another group of nine states, including New York,
have statutes that are denominated "privacy" statutes but are worded in such a way as to
protect the economic interests of celebrities in certain aspects of their identities. In only two
states, Nebraska and New York, the courts "expressly rejected the concept and held that a
common law Right of Publicity does not exist."
119. See generally, Madow, supra note 76.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Weiler, supra note 84, at 224.
123. 989 F.2d 1512 (9th Cir. 1993).
124. The majority isn't, in fact, preventing the 'evisceration' of Vanna White's existing
rights; it's creating a new and much broader property right, a right unknown in Califor-
nia law. It's replacing the existing balance between the interests of the celebrity and
those of the public by a different balance, one substantially more favorable to the ce-
lebrity. Instead of having an exclusive right in her name, likeness, signature or voice,
every famous person now has an exclusive right to anything that reminds the viewer of
her.
Id. at 1515.
125. J. Thomas McCarthy, Is Vanna White Right and Judge Kozinski Wrong?, 3 Err. L.
Rprm. 9 (1993); Russell J. Frackman & Tammy C. Bloomfield, The Right of Publicity: Going to
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If these new technologies facilitate the reproduction and distribution
of image, sound, and what have you, then the scope of the traditional
permitted use should grow proportionally as well. That is of course, un-
less the traditional intellectual property law will freeze and impair the
faster pace and flexibility of these technologies.
Although the decision applies California law, it will undoubtedly
have its influence in other circuits. However, as the Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals noted, California has an overriding interest in safeguarding
its citizens from the diminution in value of their names and likenesses,
enhanced by California's status as the center of the entertainment indus-
try.' 26 Meanwhile, because of White, other cases that involve creative
ways of supposed misappropriation, are being brought to the courts.' 27
B. State Legislation
In 1903, the state of New York, acting to reverse the Court of Ap-
peals' decision in the famous Roberson case,'2 8 adopted a statute estab-
lishing both criminal and civil liability for the unauthorized use of, "the
name, portrait or picture of any living person" for "advertising purposes,
or for the purposes of trade.' 29
This statute became the model for "name-and-likeness" statutes sub-
sequently enacted in thirteen other states. ° Today, several states have
codified the right of publicity, and recognize an independent common-
law right of publicity, while other states lack statutory protection yet rec-
ognize the publicity right at common law.' 3 ' To compound the confusion,
those jurisdictions recognizing either a statutory or common-law right of
publicity disagree as to the inheritability of the right. 32
the Dogs?, Sep. 1996 (Reprinted with permission of the L.A. DAILY JouRNAL) (visited Nov.
1996) <http:www.gseis.ucla.edu/iclp/rftb.html>.
126. Sinatra v. National Enquirer, Inc. 854 F.2d 1191, 1202 (9th Cir. 1988).
127. CMG Worldwide that manages the licensing rights to the champion thoroughbred
racehorse Cigar, is suing an artist who sells lithographs and T-shirts which depict Cigar.
Currently on appeal in California is a lawsuit brought by Fred Astaire's widow against
Best Film & Video for using clips of Fred Astaire for an instructional dance video.
Dennis Rodman has filed a complaint alleging, among other things, infringement of his
right of publicity due to the production and distribution of long-sleeved jerseys bearing
exact replicas of the actual tattoos located on his body.
Frackman & Bloomfield, supra note 125.
128. 64 N.E. 442 (N.Y. 1902).
129. 1903 N.Y. Laws §132 1-2, codified as amended at N.Y. Civ. Rights Law §§50-51 (Mc
Kinney 1988.)
130. McCARnrIY, supra note 81, § 6.1[B], at 6-6.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 6.1[B].
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Fourteen states have adopted statutes which recognize a right of pub-
licity, or a similar right under another name. 33 Most statutes were
adopted during the 70s although Indiana has adopted its own more re-
cently in 1994.131 The California and New York statutes were the first
state laws to codify the misappropriation of one's identity.13 5 Both stat-
utes are triggered when the likeness or name of a person is being used
for "purposes of trade."' 36 However, California's statutory right of pub-
licity is broader than the New York one.137
In New York, the right of publicity is covered by provisions of the
Civil Rights Law and the New York General Business Law.' 38 The New
York Right of Privacy Statute provides for a civil cause of action, both in
law and in equity. New York state courts do not recognize a common
law right of publicity.
Section 3344 of the California code was adopted in 1972. It was
amended in 1985, when California also enacted Civil Code § 990, which
codified post-mortem publicity rights. Both § 3344 and § 990 protect the
name, voice, signature, photograph, and likeness of human persons.
Generally, a person's right of publicity is also violated through the
commercial use of look-a-likes or features which, when used in the
proper context, identify the person. New York recently amended its right
of privacy statute to make actionable the misappropriation of one's
voice.13 9 California and several other states recognize, by statute, a
cause of action for infringement on the right of publicity through the
unauthorized commercial use of voices, sound-alikes, or signatures. n
At the federal level, there is no statute or common law for the right
of publicity. However, the U.S. Copyright Act and the Lanham Act are
often cited in right of publicity claims.' 4' The adoption of a uniform fed-
133. Id. § 6.2, at 6-10; See also Richard Raysman & Peter Brown, Licensing Celebrity
Rights of Publicity (visited Dec., 1996) <http://ww.brownraysman.com/features.html>.




138. Civ. Rights L. §§ 50-51 ("Right of Privacy Statute") and by N.Y. Gen. Bus. L. § 397,
cited in Raysman & Brown, supra note 133.
139. Raysman & Brown, supra note 133.
140. Id.
141. In particular, §§ 2(a) and 2(c) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1052(a) and
1052(c), can provide a negative right to assert an interest in personal identity sufficient
to prevent someone else from registering a trademark or service mark. The state claim
of right of publicity infringement remains and can be asserted in federal court only
under diversity jurisdiction or if pendent to a related federal claim. See Raysman &
Brown, supra note 133.
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eral right of publicity statute has been proposed by some scholars and
legislative groups as a solution to the inconsistent and dispersed state
laws.
Finally, the right of publicity has been recognized by the American
Law Institute in its Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition as the
Appropriation of the Commercial Value of a Person's Identity. 42 "The
Right of Publicity. One who appropriates the commercial value of a per-
son's identity by using without consent the person's name, likeness, or
other indicia of identity for purposes of trade is subject to liability for
[monetary and injunctive] relief."143 With the inclusion of the right
under the law of unfair competition, the commercial and property char-
acteristics of the right are clearly acknowledged. The previous classifica-
tion of the right of publicity as one of the four types of invasion of
privacy on the Restatement of Torts created much of the confusion be-
tween the privacy and publicity rights.
C. Historical Rationales for the Right
Courts and commentators have identified three justifications for the
right of publicity. First, is the moral right of a person to "reap the fruit
of their labors," and a corollary concern with unjust enrichment.'" Sec-
ond, there are the economic arguments, with the most popular being the
copyright-incentive theory that protecting the value of one's persona
stimulates creative efforts. 145 Third, is the protection of the consumer
from advertising deception. 46 Most of these rationales are controversial;
while many of them prove to be wrong or, in the case of consumer de-
ception, appear redundant when applied to appropriations of celebrity
identity. Why this simplicity on the part of the judicial decisions? Ac-
cording to Prof. Grady, "[i]n most cases in which these theories are re-
cited, it seems doubtful that even the judges take them very seriously,
but many judges include them probably out of deference to the Realist
tradition, which requires an explicit consideration of 'public policy' in
practically every case.'147
142. RESTATEMENT (THiRD) OF THE LAW OF UNFAIR COM'ETMON 46 (1995).
143. Id.
144. Madow, supra note 76, at 179.
145. Id. at 205.
146. Id. at 228; Weiler, supra note 84, at 240; But compare, J. Thomas McCarthy, Melville
B. Nirnner and The Right of Publicity: A Tribute, 34 UcLA L. RFv. 1703 (1987).
147. Mark F. Grady, A Positive Economic Theory of the Right of Publicity, 1 UCLA ENT.
L. Rev. 97, 107 (1994).
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1. Moral Arguments
The moral argument dates back to Melville Nimmer's 1954 article,
"The Right of Publicity.' 148 He based his theory on a principle of Anglo-
American jurisprudence; "that every person is entitled to the fruit of his
labors unless there are important countervailing public policy considera-
tions."'1 49 Numerous courts have used the same justification, rephrasing
it as the right to "reap the fruits of their labors" and the right to control
what one has created or the injustice of permitting others to "reap where
they have not sown."'15
The theory, apart from being too simple, presents major flaws. It is
evident that fame is not always the result of hard work, actually it may
be the result of luck, public image, or mere scandal. More important is
the fact that fame is not achieved without the aid of mass-media, and the
consequent participation of the public in the image making of a star. The
celebrity's labor by itself is not enough. It is a collective social phenome-
non where we as audience recreate the ideas, information, and personali-
ties that are transmitted to us by the infotainment media.
Today, courts use a more plausible argument which is based upon the
moral offense to a celebrity's dignity when their likeness or name is asso-
ciated with products without their consent.' 5 ' However, there is a flaw
in this moral rationale for the right of publicity. The harm the courts are
considering is not so much to the commercial value of the celebrity, but
to celebrity's interest in not falsely endorsing or being placed in a false
light.'52 Thus, the current law of false advertising, defamation, and pri-
vacy would apply, offsetting the need for a separate right of publicity.
The moral rationale can also be formulated as an unjust enrichment
argument. More precisely, the infringer who, with no authorization ap-
propriates the celebrity's persona "reaps where another has sown."
148. Nimmer, supra note 105.
149. Id at 216.
150. Madow, supra note 76, at 178.
151. Grant v. Esquire, Inc., 367 F. Supp. 876, 878 (S.D. N.Y. 1973); Waits v. Frito-Lay,
Inc., 978 F.2d 1093, 1100 (9th Cir. 1992) (in both cases the celebrity had taken a public position
against the commerical exploitation of their publicity rights. The court held in both cases that
the mere use of a celbrity's identity caused embarassment for which mental distress damages
would be available).
152. [T]he right of publcity allows celebrities to avoid the emotional distress caused by
unwanted commercial use of their identities. Publicity rights, however, are meant to
protect against the loss of financial gain, not mental anguish.. .Laws preventing unfair
competition, such as the Lanham Act, and laws prohibitting the intentional infliction of
emotional distress adequately cover that ground.
Cardtoons, 95 F.3d 975.
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However, the theory does not satisfy some cases of sound-alikes or look-
alikes of a celebrity who has expended much labor into her image, but in
which the courts have not recognized a right.' 3 Second, the law tolerates
commercial free-riding.'54 The celebrity may have done some free-riding
herself, using the earlier labors of others to fabricate a distinctive
persona.
The challenge comes in finding where the state should draw the line
between actionable appropriation and non-actionable imitation. While
the livelihood of an author is an important justification for some intellec-
tual property law, stars' livelihoods do not obviously rest on T-shirts or
posters, but on their primary career activities. Also, most of these unau-
thorized commercial appropriators often add some talent of their own,
which also contributes to the common image making process. 55
2. Economic Rationale
The second justification offered for the right of publicity is that pro-
tection of the economic value of the celebrity's identity, like copyright
and patent laws, encourages the celebrity to create performances that
enrich common culture. This was first stated in the case of Zacchini v.
153. See Shaw v. Time-Life Records, 38 N.Y.2d 201 (1975) (The NY Courts of Appeals
refused to create a private property right over Artie Shaw's swing music. The Court would
protect the plaintiff from defendant's passing off his phone records as Artie Shaw's, but not
from the defendant's mere appropriation of the Artie Shaw swing type of sound). Compare
Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093, 1100 (9th Cir 1992), where the court recognized and
enforced Wait's publicity rights against sound-alike defendant.
154. [T]he maxim that all's fair in love, war and the free market. Plaintiffs' case rests
on the assumption that the polls operated to siphon off the New Kids' fans or divert
their resources away from 'official' New Kids products. Even were we to accept this
premise, no tort claim has been made out: 'So long as the plaintiff's contractual rela-
tions are merely contemplated or potential, it is considered to be in the interest of the
public that any competitor should be free to divert them to himself by all fair and
reasonable means.. .In short, it is no tort to beat a business rival to prospective custom-
ers.' (Citations omitted.)
New Kids On The Block v. News America Publ'g., Inc., 971 F.2d 302,310 (9th Cir., 1992) (New
Kids, a musical group, brought suit against newspapers alleging infringement from use of
group's trademark in polls on group's popularity. The Court of Appeals held that newspapers
were entitled to nominative fair use defense; the fact that newspapers used toll telephone
numbers to conduct poll which competed with services offered by group did not make defense
unavailable; the use of group's name did not amount to commercial or common-law misappro-
priation under California law; and musical group did not have claim for intentional interfer-
ence with respective economic advantage based on newspapers' fair and reasonable use of
mark).
155. Madow, supra note 76, at 192-95, 209.
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Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co.,'5 6 but today it is even more pertinent,
given the lucrative returns that celebrities enjoy for their endorsements.
The answer to this economic rationale is that society already rewards
generously successful athletes, actors, and entertainers for their contri-
butions and compensates them for the "sweat of the brow" or "economic
rent" they have invested in developing their identities." 7 The economic-
incentive argument, however, fails to distinguish between the entertain-
ment value generated by celebrities and the value of what is secured by a
right of publicity, a secondary income.158
A different economic argument, in favor of a private property right
on the celebrity's persona, is to prevent the overexploitation of celebri-
ties personas and allow the celebrity to maximize her advertising value.
This, also called 'rent dissipation theory,' is different from the usual
Legal Realist Theories.159 First, it is based on modem economic theory
and second, it is been made simple in order to be falsifiable. 16 °
156. 433 U.S. 562 (1977).
157. Moreover, the additional inducement for achievement produced by publicity
rights are often inconsequential because most celebrities with valuable commercial
identities are already handsomely compensated. Actor Jim Carrey, for example, re-
ceived twenty million dollars for starring in the movie The Cable Guy... and major
league baseball players' salaries currently average over one million dollars per
year.. .Such figures suggest that 'even without the right of publicity the rate of return
to stardom in the entertainment and sports fields is probably high enough to bring forth
a more than 'adequate' supply of creative effort and achievement.. .In addition, even in
the absence of publicity rights, celebrities would still be able to reap financial reward
from authorized appearances and endorsements. The extra income generated by li-
censing one's identity does not provide a necessary inducement to enter and achieve in
the realm of sports and entertainment. Thus, while publicity rights may provide some
incentive for creativity and achievement, the magnitude and importance of that incen-
tive has been exaggerated. (Citations omitted)
Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass'n, 95 F.3d 959, 974 (10th Cir., 1996)
(Parody trading cards producer brought action against baseball players association to obtain
declaratory judgment that parody trading cards did not infringe on players' publicity rights.
The Court of Appeals held that producer's First Amendment rights outweighed players' right
of publicity.)
158. Even if there is some substitutive effect, and card collectors with limited resources
decide to buy parody cards instead of traditional, licensed cards, the small amount of
additional income generated by suppressing parody cards will have little, if any, effect
on the incentive to become a major league baseball player.
Id
159. Grady, supra note 147, at 115-116.
160. Id. at 116 ("Ideally, a theory should be both falsifiable and true.") See also RicHARD
A. POSNER, EcoNorfIc ANALYsIs OF LAW 3.3, at 43 (4th ed. 1992).
It might seem that creating a property right in such uses would not lead to any socially
worthwhile investment but would simply enrich already wealthy celebrities. However,
whatever information value a celebrity's endorsement has to consumers will be lost if
every advertiser can use the celebrity's name and picture... The value of associating
MARQUETTE SPORTS LAW JOURNAL
There are several problems with this line of reasoning. For instance,
the value of paraphernalia increases as the number of consumers in-
creases. However, where "everybody's got one," because there are op-
tions other than going to the star, the effect is that there is too much
paraphernalia and the prices go down. Where the star has total control
of the use of her persona, the effect becomes that of underproducing or
overpricing - typical of every monopolistic situation. On the contrary,
that rationale works for advertisers since they would not want to buy the
celebrities' images if they were over exposed. The economic rationale,
to prevent over exploitation in advertising, is the most plausible argu-
ment to justify a right of publicity for commercial use. The extent of this
right should be limited to licensing the use of celebrity's names for brand
advertisement or endorsement. But, the use on paraphernalia would fall
outside of the celebrity's dominion.
Madow makes an interesting reflection in his article.' 61 He suggests
that the problem with economic analysis is that it is based on quantity,
not quality.162 The economic view disregards a central question; that is
what is the place that celebrities should occupy in our culture? 163 No-
body can deny the important role of celebrities in modem society; even
public figures turn to entertainers for reflected status. But, this cult of
the celebrity has some negative social effects, somehow disregarded;
people become passive spectators of celebrities' private lives, their life-
style, etc.164 This identification with the famous may provide many with
a temporary evasion from their own anonymity and routine, but in the
long run it is just an illusion.' 6- The question is then, if we should en-
courage this cult with a broad right in the hands of the celebrity, or
should we limit the right to protect what is fair (performance values) and
to prohibit what is unfair (advertising misuse)? 66
3. Advertising Deception and Consumer Protection
This rationale emphasizes the function of the right of publicity as a
private law mechanism for advertising regulation. The right contributes
to protect consumers from deceptive trade practices, like false represen-
the celebrity's name with a particular product will be diminished if others are permitted
to use the name in association with their products.
161. Madow, supra note 76.
162. Id. at 214.
163. Id. at 226.
164. Id. at 228.
165. See generally id.
166. Id.
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tations of endorsement or of sponsorship. It also deters advertisers of
dangerous or shoddy products from manipulating consumers by using
celebrities' images. According to Professor Treece, the right of publicity
operates to protect consumers from being "misled about the willingness
of a celebrity to associate himself with a product or service."'167
The first problem with this rationale is that it has a spillover effect.
The consumer deception argument is that the right of publicity enables
celebrities to prevent commercial uses of their personas that are not in
any way misleading or fraudulent. The right of publicity applies even
where there is no danger that consumers will think that the featured ce-
lebrity has endorsed the product. One example is the increasingly com-
mon advertising practice of using celebrity "look-alikes" and "sound-
alikes." Most consumers understand that it is not the real celebrity. It is
also evident that today's average consumer does not assume the en-
dorsement of a celebrity even when buying paraphernalia articles (such
as posters, T-shirts, etc.). It then seems that the focus of the right of
publicity is not on the consumer's interest, but rather on the celebrity's
interest in controlling and benefiting from the economic value of her
identity.
The right of publicity for the purpose of avoiding consumer decep-
tion is redundant. The celebrity can obtain appropriate relief under the
Lanham Act or a state law equivalent. The right of publicity, unlike the
Lanham Act, has no likelihood of confusion requirement and is thus po-
tentially more expansive than the Lanham Act. One commentator rec-
ommends that courts either use the Lanham Act as a type of federal
publicity right or incorporate the Act's likelihood-of-confusion require-
ment into the right of publicity.168 Another problem is that the right of
publicity does not guarantee true advertising. The endorsement does
not necessarily mean that there will be good quality or truth in the
167. James M. Treece, Commercial Exploitation of Names, Likenesses, and Personal His-
tories, 51 TEx. L. REv. 637, 647 (1973).
168. Recent cases involving celebrity look-alikes and sound-alikes bear this out. See
Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding that use of a Tom Waits sound-
alike in a radio ad for a food product violates the Lanham Act), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1047
(1993); Prudhomme v. Procter & Gamble Co., 800 F. Supp. 390 (E.D. La. 1992) (involving a
claim stated under the Lanham Act for use of a look-alike); Allen v. Men's World Outlet, Inc.,
679 F. Supp. 360 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (holding that use of a Woody Allen look-alike in an ad for a
clothing store violates the Lanham Act unless accompanied by an effective disclaimer of any
connection between Allen and the product; injunctive relief granted); & Allen v. Nat'l Video,
Inc., 610 F. Supp. 612 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (holding that use of an Allen look-alike in an ad vio-
lates the Lanham Act because it creates a likelihood of confusion as to his endorsement or
involvement with the advertised product; injunctive relief granted).
1998]
MARQUETTE SPORTS LAW JOURNAL
claims made in the ads. As Professor Shiffrin notes, the right of publicity
gives a public figure power "to control the dissemination of truth for his
or her own profit.' 69 This interest contradicts the higher interest in soci-
ety's right to free speech.
D. A Sociological Criticism of the Right of Publicity
The commercial exploitation of famous personae is nothing new, dat-
ing back to the eighteenth century. 170 If the right of publicity is 'inher-
ent,' why is it that the right did not appear until recently? As Madow
extensively explains in his article,171 the key for the recognition of the
right has been the triumph of a centralized mass media, that had the
power to make all believe that famous persons deserved to reap the so-
cially created symbols and meanings for themselves. Some part of the
doctrine even describes the right of publicity as a "commonsensical" or
"self-evident legal right." '72 But, the right of publicity, while universal in
form, is in reality, a special celebrity's right; for non-celebrities the right
of privacy is enough.
The right of publicity has been defined as, "the right of a person to
control the commercial use of his or her identity."' 73 But, this definition
resembles more the privacy right of every person, which would still apply
to the celebrity as a human being. A part of the doctrine opines that it
would have been easier to construe the right of privacy to protect some
of the uses covered by the right of publicity, instead of creating a parallel
right of publicity. 174 That publicity sphere of the right of privacy would
remain with the celebrity, unlike other aspects of her privacy rights, that
are gone when the star enters the public eye.
Every person has the same right to control the manner of the com-
mercial exploitation of her persona. The difference with a non-celebrity
is that the celebrity, from the moment she gets in the public eye, trades
off much of her personal right to control the use of her persona, which
remains untouched in a non-public figure. Her persona is used by the
169. Steven Shiffrin, The First Amendment And Economic Regulation: Away From A
General Theory Of The First Amendment, 78 Nw. U. L. REv. 1212, (1983).
170. See LEo BRAUDY, THE FRENZY OF RENOWN: FAmE & ITS HISTORY 452, 380 (1986)
(Braudy identifies the mid-18th century as the period in which "the rapid diffusion of books
and pamphlets, portraits and caricatures," brought forth "a new quality of psychic connection
between those who watch and those who.. .perform on the public stage.") cited in Madow,
supra note 76, at 94.
171. See generally, Madow, supra note 76.
172. MccARTHY, supra note 81.
173. Id. § 1.1{B}{2}, at 1-5.
174. Id.
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public and the media, without her consent. It is a collective work and, as
such, the members of society should be free to use the public persona of
the celebrity for communication or speech purposes - including the
symbolic speech of most paraphernalia products.
Most courts have accepted the existence of the right, without much
questioning. It appears less obvious to courts that individuals and
groups also use star's signs in their everyday lives to communicate mean-
ings of their own making. This unclearness is reflected in the unsound
and incoherent history of the right of publicity, owing much of its recog-
nition to the pressure of a powerful entertainment industry. The right
exists now, but at the expense of compelling values such as free expres-
sion and cultural pluralism. The property that is assigned to celebrities
provides them with a right to decide the image that they want to project
on society, in a sort of monopoly that ultimately constricts alternative
meanings. What happens eventually is that the power to license be-
comes the power to suppress speech and power, ultimately to limit the
communicative opportunities of the rest of society.
On the Internet, this expressive process of society becomes more ap-
parent; it is the tip of the iceberg. Because it is a better realization of
democracy where everyone can get his or her word out to the world, a
publicity right clashes more violently on-line than in the mass media off-
line world. The weak basis for this right should re-open the question of
the scope of the right of publicity, and more important, the impact of
publicity rights on the distribution of cultural power in the digital age.
The new age is bringing along the era of individualization and customiza-
tion of consumer products. In particular, infotainment is going to be so
custom made that there is going to be a great loss of traditional common
ground.17 There will be less chances to outperform in anything on a long
term basis. With a centralized media, it is easy to reach a majority of the
audience, but with diversification, stars will have to increase their
efforts.
IV. LEGAL ANALYSIS OF THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY
This section analyzes the limits that the First Amendment interest of
society imposes on celebrities' individual right of publicity. It also identi-
fies the different on-line uses of the likeness and persona of the celebrity,
characterizes them by analogy to real world uses, and weighs them vis-h-
vis the First Amendment. The legal analysis reaches the conclusion that
175. See Mike Yamamoto, Marketing the Medium, CNET NEws, Sept. 27, 1996 (visited
Oct. 20, 1996) <http:/lwww.news.comlSpecialFeatures0,5,3915,00.html>.
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most of the on-line uses fall outside of the infringement of publicity
rights, given the communicative nature of the Internet. But, it is critical
for those involved in the application of the law to understand the digital
medium, otherwise the wrong analogies will lead to wrong decisions.
A. The First Amendment exception to the Right of Publicity
One clear aspect of this controversial right of publicity is that it impli-
cates speech. Because the right involves the control of images, names, or
information that appear in the media, a public figure's exercise of the
right, might curtail the First Amendment right of society over this infor-
mation. Thus, this monopoly of the celebrity is subject to restrictions im-
posed by the interest in the free flow of information. 76 However, the
key question is where do the boundaries between the right of publicity
and the First Amendment lie? 177 This section tries to set the broad
framework for the next section, where an analysis of the interplay of
particular uses of publicity rights with the First Amendment will take
place.
There are some constitutional principles to keep in mind when con-
sidering right of publicity cases. The First Amendment is not absolute
because not all speech is protected, only free speech. To determine
which speech is free, the courts balance different categories of speech
against opposing personal and property rights.'78 Different types of con-
stitutional "speech" are given different levels of weight. News and polit-
ical opinions enjoy the highest protection, since they are at the heart of
the First Amendment. 79 Fiction stories are second because they are in-
formational and entertaining.'8 0 Commercial speech (advertising in-
176. See Sheldon W. Halpern, The Right of Publicity: Maturation of an Independent Right
Protecting the Associative Value of Personality, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 853, 867-873 (1995) (describ-
ing First Amendment concerns).
177. See Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, The Right of Publicity vs. the First Amendment: A
Property and Liability Rule Analysis, 70 IND. L. J. 47 (1994) (the author makes a case for
resolving the conflict between the Right of Publicity and the First Amendment by applying a
property and liability rule framework. The proposed system would provide some organization
on the analysis of right of publicity cases by the courts). See also Peter L. Felcher & Edward
L. Rubin, Privacy, Publicity, and the Portrayal of Real People by the Media, 88 YALE L.J. 1577
(1979) (the co-authors propose an analytical framework for balancing the First Amendment
with the right of publicity in media portrayals.)
178. For example in copyright law the court balances the copyright claim against the fair
use defense under the First Amendment. (Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569
(1994) (applies the fair use defense to a parody of a copyrighted song).
179. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 105 S.Ct. 2939, 2945 (1985).
180. Harper & Row Publishers Inc., v. Nation Enterprises, 105 S.Ct. 2218, 2232 (1985);
Winter v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 510 (1948).
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eluded) is given the lowest protection.' A much less compelling
interest is sufficient to place some restriction on "commercial speech,"
than would be necessary if the speech were non- commercial. 82
The Supreme Court has often remarked that, "The line between the
informing and the entertaining is too elusive for the protection of [the
first amendment].. .What is one man's amusement, teaches another doc-
trine,"' 83 and "entertainment itself can be important news."'" At times,
the First Amendment has been construed as a governmental form of
protection for the media. For example, by immunizing the unauthorized
use of a celebrities' persona by a newspaper. Lower courts have also
held that a remedy, for false advertising or trademark infringement,
should go no further in imposing a restraint, on commercial speech, than
is reasonably necessary to accomplish the remedial objective of prevent-
ing false advertising or likely confusion of the consuming public - the
least restrictive alternative rule. As a procedural matter, the Supreme
Court has held that the plaintiff's use of state law in a civil case is suffi-
cient "state action" to trigger the First Amendment.8 5 The same is true
in intellectual property cases brought in federal court.
How does this settled Constitutional doctrine fit in with the right of
publicity? Unfortunately, the only time the Supreme Court has balanced
the right of publicity against the right of the media to cover news was in
the Zacchini case. But, this was a unique set of facts, where what was at
stake was the primary activity of the celebrity (the performance value)
and not the more usual fact-pattern of the use of her image for advertis-
ing or more obvious commercial purposes.8 6
The right of publicity is characterized as an intellectual property
right. A defendant may not take, without authorization, a plaintiff's im-
age in order to use it as a vehicle to attract attention to the defendant's
protected message. In addition, nobody can be forced to speak for some-
181. Supra note 180.
182. Virg. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virg. Citizens Consumer Council Inc., 425 U.S. 748,
761 (1976); Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm. Of New York, 447 U.S.
557, 561 (1980); 44 Liquormart Inc. v. Rhode Island, 116 S.Ct. 1495, 1507 (1996).
183. Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 510 (1948).
184. Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 578.
185. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
186. Zacchini involved the broadcast of the plaintiff's entire performance. "[The claim]
may be the strongest case for a 'right of publicity'- involving, not the appropriation of an
entertainer's reputation to enhance the attractiveness of a commercial product, but the appro-
priation of the very activity by which the entertainer acquired this reputation in the first
place." Zacchini, U.S. 433 at 576.
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one's product or to lend one's property as a vehicle for a defendant's
speech.
On the other hand, the courts have consistently protected the consti-
tutional right to free dissemination of ideas. "The right of publicity has
not been held to outweigh the value of free expression"'187 and First
Amendment policy considerations clearly immunize the entertainment
or newsworthy uses, despite the celebrity's property interest.188 The Re-
statement of Unfair Competition restricts the right of publicity from,
"the use of a person's identity in news reporting, commentary, entertain-
ment, in works of fiction or in advertising that is incidental to such
uses."' 8 9 The First Amendment insulates these uses from illicit
appropriation.
Many cases of appropriation of a public figure's likeness involve situ-
ations in which the infringer's use is not characterized as speech, because
it does not involve spreading information in any conventional medium
- paraphernalia, for example.190 In some cases, however, defendants
might assert that these are forms of "symbolic speech" designed to ex-
187. Guglielmi v. Spelling-Goldberg Prods., 603 P.2d 454, 462 (Cal. 1979). (Bird, J., con-
curring) (Nephew of the deceased movie actor Rudolph Valentino filed suit seeking damages
and injunctive relief on the theory that defendants had misappropriated Valentino's "right of
publicity" and that plaintiff, as Valentino's legal heir, was the present owner of that right. The
Supreme Court held that the right of publicity protects against the unauthorized use of one's
name, likeness or personality, but the right is not descendible and expires upon the death of
the person so protected.)
188. By analogy to copyright law and the fair use doctrine, parody, burlesque, satire
and critical review might be immune from the right of publicity because of their contri-
bution as entertainment and as a form of literary criticism. In contrast to an imitator,
who usurps a work for commercial gain without contributing substantially to the work,
a commentator, parodist or satirist makes use of another's attributes in order to create
a larger presentation. (Citation omitted).
Groucho Marx Productions, Inc., v. Day & Night Co. Inc., 523 F. Supp 485, 492-93 (S.D.N.Y.
1981). (Assignees of the Marx Brothers' rights of publicity brought action against producers
of musical play, "A Day in Hollywood/A Night In the Ukraine" for misappropriation of pro-
priety rights, for interference with contractual relations, and for infringement of common-law
copyright and unfair competition and defendants asserted third-party claims. The District
Court held that New York courts would not only recognize the right of publicity, they would
recognize the descendibility and assignability of that right; assignability did not require that
claimant exploit his rights of publicity during lifetime by commercial use other than celebrity's
main commercial activity; exploitation in movies by the Marx brothers of characters which
they had created was sufficient to create rights which were capable of being assigned; those
characters were infringed by musical play in which characters reproducing the Marx brothers'
style of humor appeared; and that use of Marx brothers characters was not protected by First
Amendment as a parody.)
189. RE TATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW OF UNFAIR COMPETITION 47 (1995).
190. "These objects, unlike motion pictures, are not vehicles through which ideas and
opinions are regularly disseminated." Guglielmi, 603 P.2d at 463.
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press or identify themselves with a public figure's image. A court con-
fronting this argument should closely scrutinize the defendant's actions
in order to determine whether they are in fact communicative and
whether such activities would normally be viewed by outsiders as evi-
dence of the defendant's desire to engage in symbolic speech. If a court
found that First Amendment interests were involved, the plaintiff's right
of publicity would not likely prevail over the defendant's exercise of free
speech.191
In post mortem cases, the conflict is more acute. A right of publicity
of long post-mortem duration allows public figures' heirs to enjoin uses
of the celebrities' personas for about fifty years after their deaths. 92 On
the contrary, with the passage of time, many public figures unquestiona-
bly come to represent ideals or role models for society. The fact that
someone wants to market the image and likeness of these figures (e.g.,
memorabilia), after their death, may indicate that the figures have come
to convey these particular ideals. "Attempts by the heirs of such figures
to enjoin the use of their ancestors' images could prevent the ideals em-
bodied by the images from freely circulating."' 93
Some part of the doctrine has criticized this traditional conception: "The purchase and
display of celebrity memorabilia does not, therefore, represent public access to media-dissemi-
nated information or entertainment as much as it becomes a form of public expression
through a 'media' of its own." Andrew B. Sims, Right of Publicity: Survivability Reconsid-
ered, 49 FoRDHAM L. REv. 453, 495 (1981).
More recently, the 10th Circuit rejected a right of publicity claim over baseball trading
cards:
MLBPA contends that Cardtoons' speech [baseball trading cards] receives less protec-
tion because it fails to use a traditional medium of expression. The protections af-
forded by the First Amendment, however, have never been limited to newspapers and
books. The Supreme Court has relied on the First Amendment to strike down ordi-
nances that ban the distribution of pamphlets, the circulation of handbills, and the
display of yard signs. Moreover, many untraditional forms of expression are also pro-
tected by the First Amendment.. .Thus, even if the trading cards are not a traditional
medium of expression, they nonetheless contain protected speech. (Internal citations
omitted.)
Cardtoons, 95 F.3d at 969.
191. Martin Luther King, Jr., Center For Social Change, Inc. v. American Heritage Prod-
ucts, Inc. 694 F.2d 674, 685 (11th Cir. 1983). (Weltner, J., concurring specially) (arguing that
reproductions of King should be considered protected speech in the same manner as are stat-
ues of Confederate soldiers produced to express a particular sentiment).
192. Schumann v. Loew's Inc., 135 N.Y.S.2d 361, 369 (Sup. Ct. 1954) (dismissing attempt
by the heirs of the composer, who had died more than 100 years before, to enjoin the produc-
tion of movie based upon his life); Hicks v. Casablanca Records, 426 F. Supp (S.D.N.Y 1978).
(Agatha Christie's heirs tried to prevent the production of a movie and a book based on an
event in Christie's life. The first amendment rights of the defendants outweighed the heirs'
inherited right of publicity.)
193. Schumann, 135 N.Y.S.2d at 369.
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There is an uncertainty concerning where the line is to be drawn to
protect "free speech," because it turns upon the content of the speech
(commercial v. non-commercial) and the weight of the countervailing
tort or property interest asserted (the celebrity's right of publicity). 194
The analysis could be much simpler. The right of publicity should only
prevail in two contexts, to protect performance values when this use is
not incidental, and to prevent the unauthorized use for advertising pur-
poses. The other incidental uses: newsreporting, commentary, parody,
and the controversial paraphernalia should all be protected under the
First Amendment. Another benefit of this proposed scheme is that it
would be more compatible with the long established First Amendment
doctrine.
B. The First Amendment vis-d-vis the Right of Publicity on the
Internet
This section weighs different uses of the public persona on the In-
ternet, described in part II, against the First Amendment. In order to
make the analysis, this article first draws an analogy of each of the uses
on the net, to uses in the real world that have already been tried in the
case law. The article then draws a conclusion for each use, focusing upon
whether they should be immune to the right of publicity.
1. Alt. fan Newsgroups and Listservs as News, Gossip, Commentary
Newsgroups and Listservs' 95 are just on-line archived exchanges of
information among the users participating in these forums. They are the
194. In our pop culture, where salesmanship must be entertaining and entertainment
must sell, the line between the commercial and noncommercial has not merely blurred;
it has disappeared. Is the Samsung parody any different from a parody on Saturday
Night Live or in Spy Magazine? Both are equally profit-motivated. Both use a celeb-
rity's identity to sell things-one to sell VCRs, the other to sell advertising. Both mock
their subjects. Both try to make people laugh. Both add something, perhaps something
worthwhile and memorable, perhaps not, to our culture. Both are things that the peo-
ple being portrayed might dearly want to suppress.
White, 989 F.2d at 1520.
195. Definitions of these terms are as follows:
24. One-to-many messaging. The Internet also contains automatic mailing list services
(such as 'listservs'), [also referred to by witnesses as 'mail exploders'] that allow com-
munications about particular subjects of interest to a group of people. For example,
people can subscribe to a 'listserv' mailing list on a particular topic of interest to them.
The subscriber can submit messages on the topic to the listserv that are forwarded (via
e-mail), either automatically or through a human moderator overseeing the listserv, to
anyone who has subscribed to the mailing list. A recipient of such a message can reply
to the message and have the reply also distributed to everyone on the mailing list. This
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equivalent to real world conversations since they are a one-to-many way
of communication. 196 But, because they are archived, they also resemble
news, gossip, or commentary.
Conversation is perhaps the most obvious expression of speech. A
newsgroup would be in this category, somewhat like a fan-club that
meets regularly to talk about the star, her movies, performances, or what
have you. This type of communication is an essential part of the market-
service provides the capability to keep abreast of developments or events in a particu-
lar subject area. Most listserv-type mailing lists automatically forward all incoming
messages to all mailing list subscribers. There are thousands of such mailing list serv-
ices on the Internet, collectively with hundreds of thousands of subscribers. Users of
'open' listservs typically can add or remove their names from the mailing list automati-
cally, with no direct human involvement. Listservs may also be 'closed,' i.e., only al-
lowing for one's acceptance into the listserv by a human moderator.
25. Distributed message databases. Similar in function to listservs - but quite dif-
ferent in how communications are transmitted - are distributed message databases
such as 'USENET newsgroups.' User-sponsored newsgroups are among the most popu-
lar and widespread applications of Internet services, and cover all imaginable topics of
interest to users. Like listservs, newsgroups are open discussions and exchanges on
particular topics. Users, however, need not subscribe to the discussion mailing list in
advance, but can instead access the database at any time. Some USENET newsgroups
are 'moderated' but most are open access. For the moderated newsgroups all messages
to the newsgroup are forwarded to one person who can screen them for relevance to
the topics under discussion. USENET newsgroups are disseminated using ad hoc, peer
to peer connections between approximately 200,000 computers (called USENET 'serv-
ers') around the world. For uumoderated newsgroups, when an individual user with
access to a USENET server posts a message to a newsgroup, the message is automati-
cally forwarded to all adjacent USENET servers that furnish access to the newsgroup,
and it is then propagated to the servers adjacent to those servers, etc. The messages are
temporarily stored on each receiving server, where they are available for review and
response by individual users. The messages are automatically and periodically purged
from each system after a time to make room for new messages. Responses to
messages, like the original messages, are automatically distributed to all other com-
puters receiving the newsgroup or forwarded to a moderator in the case of a moderated
newsgroup. The dissemination of messages to USENET servers around the world is an
automated process that does not require direct human intervention or review.
Reno, 929 F.Supp. at 834.
196. [N]o public purpose would be served by permitting Stern to silence Delphi; on
the contrary. Indeed, it is ironic that Stern, a radio talk show host (as well as author and
would-be politician) seeks to silence the electronic equivalent of a talk show, an on-line
computer bulletin board service.
Stern v. Delphi Internet Serve Corp., 626 N.Y.S.2d 694, 700 (Sup. Ct., 1995). (Radio celeb-
rity brought action against Delphi -Online Service Provider- alleging commercial misap-
propriation arising from company's use of celebrity's name and picture to advertise its
electronic bulletin board for debate on celebrity's candidacy for office of governor. The
Supreme Court, New York County, held that Delphi was "news disseminator" for purpose of
commercial misappropriation statute, and the use of celebrity's name and photograph fell
within "incidental use" exception to liability. The Court granted defendant's summary
judgment.)
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place of ideas and its protection is at the heart of the First Amendment.
Any use of the celebrity's persona as part of this communicative ex-
change would be permissible, even though the image or opinions pur-
ported might not be the ones intended by the celebrity herself. But, one
cannot ban speech just because it is distasteful, or because one disagrees
with it or dislikes it.' 97
The problem is more complex if one considers the archived feature of
these newsgroups. All messages posted to these groups remain stored or
archived, resembling real world public archives of periodic publications,
such as magazines, specialized newsletters, newspapers, and so forth. 98
The newsgroup topic relevant to this analysis would be the life and deeds
of the rich and famous. So, maybe the best comparison that can be
drawn is to gossip magazines, trade magazines, or even newspapers, if
the content is newsworthy. Is this kind of media insulated from right of
publicity infringement?
197. The constitutional right of free expression is powerful medicine in a society as
diverse and populous as ours. It is designed and intended to remove governmental
restraints from the arena of public discussion, putting the decision as to what views
shall be voiced largely into the hands of each of us, in the hope that use of such free-
dom will ultimately produce a more capable citizenry and more perfect polity and in
the belief that no other approach would comport with the premise of individual dignity
and choice upon which our political system rests.. .To many, the immediate conse-
quence of this freedom may often appear to be only verbal tumult, discord, and even
offensive utterance. These are, however, within established limits, in truth necessary
side effects of the broader enduring values which the process of open debate permits us
to achieve. That the air may at times seem filled with verbal cacophony is, in this sense
not a sign of weakness but of strength. We cannot lose sight of the fact that, in what
otherwise might seem a trifling and annoying instance of individual distasteful abuse of
a privilege, these fundamental societal values are truly implicated. (Citations Omitted)
Cohen v. State of California, 91 S.Ct. 1780, 1788 (1971).
198. Although only paid subscribers may access Delphi's on-line information services
from their computers or terminals, this service is analogous to that of a news vendor or
bookstore, or a letters-to-the-editor column of a newspaper, which require purchase of
their materials for the public to actually gain access to the information carried. As
Judge Leisure of the United States District Court, Southern District of New York, has
noted, 'a computerized database is the functional equivalent of a more traditional news
vendor, and the inconsistent application of a lower standard of liability to an electronic
news distributor.. .than that which is applied to a public library, book store, or news-
stand would impose an undue burden on the free flow of information.' Cubby, Inc. v.
CompuServe, Inc., 776 F.Supp. 135, 140 (S.D.N.Y.1991). In Cubby, Judge Leisure
found that Compuserve, a computer service company that provides service similar to
Delphi, was in essence 'an electronic, for-profit library' which is afforded the same First
Amendment protections as distributors of publications. Similarly, here it is evident
that Delphi's on-line service must be analogized to distributors such as news vendors,
bookstores and libraries. (Emphasis added)
Stern, 626 N.Y.S.2d at 697.
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The use of the celebrity's persona in the off-line media as part of
"news"- information, gossip, commentary, entertainment- about a
person is constitutionally protected from infringement of the right of
publicity.199 But, there has to be a connection between the use of the
persona and the content conveyed in the news.2"' Otherwise, the use of
the persona would be for non-communicative purposes - probably,
commercial and very little informational - falling outside the scope of
First Amendment protection.20 '
The courts have defined the term 'news' very broadly. "News" com-
prises any issues of public concern which, "is by no means limited to the
dissemination of news in the sense of current events but extends [to] all
types of factual, educational and historical data, or even entertainment
and amusement, concerning interesting phases of human activity in gen-
eral. '12  For Constitutional purposes, 'issues of public concern' are those
that one can find in newspapers, magazines, and the media.20 3 The
thrust is that the media serves the public thirst for information that is,
"needed or appropriate.. .to cope with the exigencies of [the] period. '20 4
It is obviously a non-exclusive list that includes anything that may be
"considered newsworthy to special groups. '205 Thus, gossip is part of
this list of newsworthy items because, "[g]ossip columns open people's
eyes to opportunities and dangers [and] are genuinely informational. '2 6
199. Rosemont Enterprises, Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 294 N.Y.S.2d 122, 128-29 (1969)
(Just as a public figure's right of publicity must yield to the public interest so too must the
right of publicity bow where such conflicts with the free dissemination of thoughts, ideas,
newsworthy events, and matters of public interest).
200. Id
201. Dallesandro v. Henry Holt & Co., 166 N.Y.S.2d 805 (1957) (photo of author talking
to plaintiff was reproduced on cover of a book. Held to be immune from liability because it
illustrated the content of the book although plaintiff was not mentioned in the book.) Com-
pare Grant, 367 F. Supp. at 878 (The use of Cary Grant's photo in an article about men's
fashion "serves no function but to attract attention to the article.")
202. Paulsen v. Personality Posters, Inc., 299 N.Y.S.2d 501,506 (Sup. Ct. 1968). (Action by
television comedian, who conducted mock campaign for presidency, to enjoin defendants
from marketing poster embodying plaintiff's photograph. Plaintiff moved for preliminary in-
junction. The Supreme Court New York County held that plaintiff was not entitled to prelimi-
nary injunction in view of apparent privilege deriving from picture's public interest character.
Temporary injunction denied).
203. Id.
204. Time Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374,388 (1967) quoting Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88,
102 (1940).
205. Welch v. Group W. Prod. Inc., 525 N.Y.S.2d 466, 468 (Sup. Ct. 1987) (not only polit-
ical happenings and social events but also articles of interest to consumer groups and fashion
events).
206. Richard A. Posner, The Right of Privacy, 12 GA L. Rnv 393, 396 (1978).
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Though gossip may look trivial, it is considered to have an important
social function. The modem press could be considered as, "performing a
traditional function that no longer can be accomplished by person-to-
person gossip alone. ' 20 7 'This traditional conception is again turned
around on the Internet. Here person-to-person communication exists
and gossip is spread easily, in part due to those celebrity devoted user-
groups that exclusively discuss celebrities' lives. One should then infer
that the content of these newsgroups is newsworthy, informational, and
thus, protected by the First Amendment.
Examples of topics held newsworthy by the courts include the latest
fashion of women's apparel,208 a celebrity's escape to a Jamaican re-
sort,209 and a movie star's love affair with another star.2 10 Again, this
illustrates the kind of conversation one can expect to find in these ori-
ented alt.fan newsgroups which would fall under a permitted use of the
celebrity's name and persona. For instance, a group might be called
alt.fan.stallone; users can post photos from Rocky - believing that they
are copyright clear- or can reveal the latest gossip on his love life.
In order to guarantee the First Amendment protection, the news us-
age has to be reasonably related to the content of the story. 1' If the use
207. Time Inc. v. Sand Creek Partners, 825 F. Supp. 210 (E.D. Wis. 1993).
208. Stephano v. News Group Publications, Inc, 485 N.Y.S.2d 220 (1984). (Plaintiff, a
professional model, brought suit claiming that defendant used his picture for trade or advertis-
ing purposes without his consent, and thus violated his statutory right to privacy. The Court of
Appeals reversed and held that defendant's publication of plaintiff's picture was protected by
newsworthiness exception).
209. Booth v. Curtis Publ'g. Co., 15 A.D.2d 343 (N.Y. 1962). (A well-known actress
brought an action against the publisher of a magazine and its advertising agency for damages
for an alleged invasion of her right to privacy in violation of the Civil Rights Law. The Appel-
late Division reversed and held that where a photograph of the actress was properly published
by the publisher in its magazine, and subsequently the publisher had the photograph repub-
lished in other magazines to advertise the publisher's magazine, the republication of the pho-
tograph was not a violation of her right to privacy in violation of the Civil Rights Law.)
210. Eastwood v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 149 Cal. App. 3d 409 (1983).
(National Enquirer featured an article falsely claiming that Eastwood was involved in a ro-
mantic triangle with singer Tanya Tcker and actress Sondra Locke. The Enquirer also ran a
television advertisement that featured Clint Eastwood's photograph and mentioned the story.
Eastwood asserted that the unauthorized use of his name and photograph in both the televi-
sion advertisement and on the front page of the paper damaged his right to control the com-
mercial exploitation of his name, photograph, and likeness and also injured his feelings and
privacy. The court recognized the viability of both a common law and statutory cause of
action under California law and commented on distinctions between the two. The court em-
phasized that an action at common law presents a less onerous burden than an action under
California Civil Code § 3344(a) since the plaintiff need prove neither a knowing use of his
persona nor a direct connection between the use and a commercial purpose).
211. See supra note 201 and accompanying text.
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is merely commercial -the use of the name or picture just to give atten-
tion to the publication and sell more copies- it is an infringement of the
right of publicity. 212 The line is blurry between what is news or story and
what is advertisement in disguise. In our newsgroup example, if we set
up a newsgroup about athletics to give publicity to the sneakers we sell,
and we call it the alt.fan.carl__lewis it would obviously infringe upon
Lewis' right of publicity. The New York Court of Appeals has empha-
sized that the test of a "real relationship" between a picture and the
content of the news is to be applied broadly, in order to find newsworthi-
ness immunization for the media.2
13
News media, such as on-line bulletin boards, have been afforded the
same First Amendment protection as the one given to more traditional
printed media. In Stem v. Delphi, a case that involved the use of come-
dian Howard Stem's image for the advertising of a bulletin board about
the celebrity, the court recognized that:
Although only paid subscribers may access Delphi's on-line infor-
mation services from their computers or terminals, this service is
analogous to that of a news vendor or bookstore, or a letters-to-
the-editor column of a newspaper, which require purchase of
their materials for the public to actually gain access to the infor-
mation carried. . .In Cubby, Judge Leisure found that Com-
puserve, a computer service company that provides service
similar to Delphi, was in essence 'an electronic, for-profit library'
which is afforded the same First Amendment protections as dis-
tributors of publications. Similarly, here it is evident that Del-
phi's on-line service must be analogized to distributors such as
news vendors, bookstores and libraries.214
All the alt.fans.newsgroups fall into this category and thus, they are
protected speech. Besides, the vast majority of these boards are not for
profit. This means that the non-commercial speech flowing in these
multi-point conversations, including pictures, sounds, and words should
not constitute infringement of the right of publicity because they should
be protected by the First Amendment. The reality, though, is that a
number of them have received 'cease and desist' letters which have
forced them to pull their newsgroups down.
212. Id.
213. Dallesandro, 166 N.Y.S.2d 805 (Photo of author talking to plaintiff was reproduced
on cover of a book. Held to be immune from liability because it illustrated the content of the
book although plaintiff was not mentioned in the book).
214. Delphi, 626 N.Y.S.2d at 697.
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2. Fans' Web Sites as Biographies On-line
Web sites215 are the millions of electronic publications that are avail-
able through the WWW. The content is formatted in HTML mark-up
language (consisting basically of a bunch of tags around the text or
images of each page) and includes hypertext links to jump from one page
to another, without a linear order.
Those web sites depicting a celebrity look pretty much like short bio-
graphical descriptions, accompanied by photos, and maybe sound and
video clips. The clear analogy for these web sites is to the real world
biographies about famous people. The courts have upheld the use of the
public persona for biographies in printed media as newsworthy and pro-
tected under the First Amendment. The best known decision is the How-
ard Hughes case, where the court held:
The Biography of Howard Hughes, published by defendants
herein, irrespective of its literary merit or style falls within those
'reports of newsworthy people or events' which are constitution-
ally protected and which are outside the proscription of the New
York 'Right of Privacy' statute.. .Just as a public figure's 'right of
privacy' must yield to the public interest so too must the 'right of
publicity' bow where such conflicts with the free dissemination of
thoughts, ideas, newsworthy events, and matters of public inter-
est.216 (Internal citations omitted.)
215. The Web utilizes a 'hypertext' formatting language called hypertext markup lan-
guage (HTML), and programs that 'browse' the Web can display HTML documents
containing text, images, sound, animation and moving video. Any HTML document
can include links to other types of information or resources, so that while viewing an
HTML document that, for example, describes resources available on the Internet, one
can 'click' using a computer mouse on the description of the resource and be immedi-
ately connected to the resource itself. Such 'hyperlinks' allow information to be ac-
cessed and organized in very flexible ways, and allow people to locate and efficiently
view related information even if the information is stored on numerous computers all
around the world...
The World Wide Web is a series of documents stored in different computers all over
the Internet. Documents contain information stored in a variety of formats, including
text, still images, sounds, and video. An essential element of the Web is that any docu-
ment has an address (rather like a telephone number). Most Web documents contain
'links.' These are short sections of text or image which refer to another document.
Reno, 929 F.Supp. at 836.
216. Rosemont Enter., 294 N.Y.S.2d at 128-29 (Action by assignee of right to exploit name
and personality of public figure against publisher and author of biography of such public fig-
ure. The Supreme Court New York County held that the factual report of newsworthy per-
sons and events falls within constitutional protections for freedom of speech and no redress is
available even for material and substantial falsification in such reporting in absence of proof
that report was published with knowledge of its falsity or in reckless disregard for truth, and
that evidence in the action failed to establish that the biography contained material and sub-
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The rationale put forth by the courts to support this particular use of
a celebrity's identity is that, "unlike the goodwill associated with one's
name or likeness, the facts of an individual's life possess no intrinsic
value that will deteriorate with repeated use. '217 This doctrine should be
applied by analogy to a web site depicting a star or celebrity. The only
difference is that the web site biography is digital as opposed to a printed
version.
Moreover, media profit and advertising do not remove First Amend-
ment protection. The Supreme Court has stated on several occasions
that, "books, newspapers, and magazines [that] are published and sold
for profit do not prevent them from being a form of expression whose
liberty is safeguarded by the First Amendment."21 The fact that the
publication is sold for profit does not automatically take it out of the
category of news speech. It will not, in every instance, be considered
commercial speech or advertisement. The rule is partially codified in
California statutes219 and the New York Court of Appeals has held the
same.
220
This principle has been applied to television programs which have
been sponsored by commercials as well as newspapers and magazines
that contain advertisements. 221 This means that a web site which features
a celebrity could be considered similar to a magazine, or a book depict-
stantial falsifications. The court further held that the public figure had no exclusive rights to
his own life story and others need no consent or permission to write his biography. Defend-
ant's summary motion granted).
217. Matthews v. Wozencraft, 30 U.S.P.Q.2d 1025 (5th Cir. 1994). (Former undercover
narcotics officer filed suit alleging breach of contract, division of marital assets, and misappro-
priation/invasion of privacy against his former wife and partner, and misappropriation and
invasion of privacy against publisher of wife's book, movie studio, and another. The Court of
Appeals held that life story was not a "name or likeness" under Texas misappropriation law;
appropriation could not occur through fictionalized account of officer's life under "false light
doctrine;" novel fell within First Amendment protection for fair use of information in private
domain; contract between plaintiff and his former wife regarding ownership rights to their
story expired by its own terms; and plaintiff's claim he had ownership rights that should have
been distributed in the parties' divorce was barred by res judicata).
218. Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 501-502 (U.S.N.Y, 1952).
219. Cal. Civ. Code § 3344(e). The unauthorized use of identity in a commercial me-
dium is not liable "solely because the material containing such use is commercially sponsored
or contains paid advertising."
220. "The statute does not define trade or advertising purposes. However, the courts
have consistently held, from the time of its enactment, that these terms should not be con-
strued to apply to publications concerning newsworthy events or matters of public interest."
Stephano, 485 N.Y.S.2d at 225 (Citations omitted).
221. Newton v. Thomason, 22 F.3d 1455 (9th Cir.1994). ("A 'commercial purpose' means
more than merely using a person's name as part of a cast of characters in a television program
advertisement that highlights the program's general plot").
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ing the facts of a star's life. Most fans' web sites are not even for profit.
But, even with those that are sponsored, or sell advertising space, by
following the same line of reasoning as the courts, these could be con-
sidered non-commercial speech and thus could be immune to right of
publicity claims.
Another interesting question, is whether the use of the celebrity's
name, as the title of a web page or even as part of the domain name -
www.clewis.com, for example, is a violation of the right of publicity? The
use of the name of a real person as the name of a character or in a title of
a work of entertainment may be exempt from the right of publicity when
the name has some sort of connection to the story and it is not picked
just to take advantage of the commercial value of the celebrity's
name.
222
Some web sites include video files depicting short video clips. Ac-
cording to their content, there would be two possible cases that might
develop. One would involve a video documenting some images on the
life of the celebrity. This would be analogous to the news or documen-
tary that the courts have upheld as permissible.3 Another use would be
the taking of actual works or performances of the celebrity. The best
analogy is the Zachinni case,2 24 where the Supreme Court held for the
performer. The broadcast of the complete performance of the canon-ball
man was not an incidental use.22 It did reap benefits from the celebrity's
work.226 As a result, only incidental clips of a performance should be
222. [The [Lanham] Act should be construed to apply to artistic works only where the
public interest outweighs the public interest in free expression. In the context of alleg-
edly misleading titles using a celebrity's name, that balance will normally not support
application of the Act unless the title has no artistic relevance to the underlying work
whatsoever, or, if it has some artistic relevance, unless the title explicitly misleads as to
the source of the content of the work...
Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994 (2d Cir 1989) (Suit was brought against producers and dis-
tributors of movie "Ginger and Fred" for violation of Lanham Act infringement of common-
law rights of publicity and privacy. The Court of Appeals held that the title of the movie
"Ginger and Fred" gave no explicit indication that Ginger Rogers endorsed the film or had a
role in producing it, and thus it was not false advertising of sponsorship or endorsement in
violation of the Lanham Act, and the movie title was closely related to the content of the
movie and was not disguised advertisement for sale of goods or services or collateral commer-
cial product, and thus did not violate the Oregon law of right of publicity.)
223. Current Audio, Inc., v. RCA Corp., 337 N.Y.S.2d 949, 953-55 (Sup. Ct. 1972). (The
Court held that a mixed media print and audio report of a rare 1972 press conference held by
entertainer Elvis Presley was not an invasion of any privacy or publicity rights of Presley).
224. 433 U.S. 562 (1977).
225. Id. at 579.
226. Id.
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permitted, in order to protect the livelihood of performers, through the
licensing of the works.
A secondary problem with the content of web pages may come from
the use of links. Hypertext links2' 7 are an essential part of web pages
since they have the function of relating documents in a non-linear order.
Most cyberlawyers defend the functional task of the links as content-
neutral connectors. But, some users, mainly businesses, do not consider
these links to be user-friendly.2' The commercialization of the Internet
has brought up the theoretical possibility of liability when using links.229
227. 36. .. Most Web documents contain 'links.' These are short sections of text or
image which refer to another document. Typically the linked text is blue or underlined
when displayed, and when selected by the user, the referenced document is automati-
cally displayed, wherever in the world it actually is stored. Links for example are used
to lead from overview documents to more detailed documents, from tables of contents
to particular pages, but also as cross-references, footnotes, and new forms of informa-
tion structure.
37. Many organizations now have 'home pages' on the Web. These are documents
which provide a set of links designed to represent the organization, and through links
from the home page, guide the user directly or indirectly to information about or rele-
vant to that organization...
39. Each of these links takes the user of the site from the beginning of the Find-
ings to the appropriate section within this Adjudication. Links may also take the user
from the original Web site to another Web site on another computer connected to the
Internet. These links from one computer to another, from one document to another
across the Internet, are what unify the Web into a single body of knowledge, and what
makes the Web unique. The Web was designed with a maximum target time to follow a
link of one tenth of a second.
Reno, 929 F.Supp. at 836-37.
228. See, for example, The Washington Post Co. v. Total News Inc., 97 Civ. 1190
(S.D.N.Y., 1997). (A group of news sources, including the Washington Post, LA Tunes,
Reuters, CNN, and others, have brought suit against the Total News web site. In their suit
filed on Feb. 20, the plaintiff's allege that the defendant's links and "framing" of their content
constitutes trademark dilution, copyright infringement, trademark infringement, false designa-
tions of origin, false representations and false advertising under 43(a), as well as five other
state causes of action.) The case was settled last June '97. The media companies agreed to
grant TotalNews a "linking license" so that it can still hyperlink to stories on its sites. See Nick
Wingfield, TotalNews, Publishers Settle Suit, CNEr NEws, June 1997, (visited June 5, 1997)
<http:llwww.news.comlNewslItem0,4,11272,00.html>.
229. See Jonathan Ezor, OPINION: Avoiding Trademark, Copyright Infringement.
Images, Links, URLs Create Problems for Web Liability, ADVERTSING AGE, (visited May 22,
1997) <http:lladage.comlinteractive/articles/19961209/article8.html>.
Theoretically one could claim liability on several grounds. However, some of these claims
lose merit when considering the implied license to linking, and the availability of technological
solutions to avoid unwanted visitors from other sites. One claim would be trademark infringe-
ment. Suppose the website had a section with related sites. One of the links brings you to a
corporation's web site that has a trademark on the name and logo. The designer of our site has
used the corporation's name and the logo as the description for the link to the corporation's
site. The link itself would constitute trademark infringement.
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Again, the key to a sound policy on the use of links should derive
from the very nature of these hypertext tags. This article proposes the
traffic-sign metaphor; other commentators consider links as mere cita-
tions to other content, or a sort of referral service. Either analogy sug-
gests that the link is a mere Internet address, a piece of factual
information - the numerical address behind the domain name. Links
only provide a path for the browser to go and get other information.
Then, it is the user and her browser who actually retrieve that informa-
tion and display it, something that they have an implicit right to do. But,
if a web site owner does not want to be linked to certain web sites, there
are technology fixes available. Even so, some parties are turning to the
courts to try to reinforce what they believe are their absolute private
property rights, as if their cases fit into a well-settled legal regime. 3
But, the merit of such cases is low because they disregard the nature of
the Internet and the way that it works.
In the case of a link bearing the name of a celebrity, a mere citation
does not represent that the content is associated with the citing party nor
does it provide the content itself. A good analogy can be drawn to a case
where the holder of the trademark, "Boston Marathon," tried to stop a
television station from using the name of the event.
[T]he words 'Boston Marathon'. .. do more than call attention to
Channel 5's program; they also describe the event that Channel 5
will broadcast. Common sense suggests (consistent with the rec-
ord here) that a viewer who sees those words flash upon the
Second, if we use an image-link, where the graphic is copyrighted, without the authoriza-
tion of the owner of the image, we would infringe upon his copyright on his work. Copyright
infringement may also arise by showing as part of our web site an image from another site
without copying it - we are just 'image-mining' somebody else's web page.
Using frames could be very problematic, from a legal standpoint. First they can be mislead-
ing for the average user since usually the URL stays the same even when you click a link to
another web site. The information from this other web site will appear in your screen,
wrapped under the frames of the initial web site where you linked from. Trying to bookmark a
page that is outside the site will be impossible since the original URL of the framed site is the
one that remains. It could lead to copyright liability as one can argue that the site with the
frames is showing another's work under a different look, without permission. Even trademark
infringement could be argued if the frames create confusion as to the origin of somebody
else's goods or services.
Finally, links between two unrelated web sites may confuse the user as to some association
between both sites. Thus, the linked site could allege false endorsement if the link was never
authorized. All these theoretical claims disregard the way the WWVV, as a hypertext based
medium, works.
230. See, e.g., Stephano, 485 N.Y.S.2d 220. But framing is just a way of linking or citing. A
mere citation does not represent the content is associated with the citing party nor does it
provide the content itself, beyond the implied license in linking.
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screen will believe simply that Channel 5 will show, or is showing,
or has shown, the marathon, not that Channel 5 has some special
approval from the [trademark holder] to do so. In technical
trademark jargon, the use of words for descriptive purposes is
called a 'fair use,' and the law usually permits it even if the words
themselves also constitute a trademark.231
The courts then, must consider the nature of the web and the techno-
logical solutions available. This should limit legal actions for presumptive
'infringement' when the defendant could not know that she was on "pri-
vate property" (a web site) because the plaintiff had failed to "build
fences" (technological fixes), restraining access from unwanted links. It
is in the interest of public policy that the legal system allow this kind of
easement, of what otherwise would be an infringement of an undesired
absolute property right,1 2 that ultimately would deny the implied right
to link.
3. Trivia Games on Celebrities as the On-line Version of Board
Games
The web is big on games. One can find trivia, sometimes called ency-
clopedia, on any topic that one can think of. These are just a collection of
questions and answers, usually set up as a database on-line to which one
can submit her response. Within the entertainment genre, the most pop-
ular trivia are those about celebrities, soap operas, movies, and televi-
sion shows. Just like fans' web sites, the majority of these trivia are
unofficial sites built by fans, instead of the star, the studio, or the
network.
These unofficial web sites, that use the name, persona, and gossip of
celebrities, raise the right of publicity question. In the real world the
obvious analogy for trivia games are board games about famous people.
231. New Kids On The Block, 971 F.2d at 307, citing WCVB-TV v. Boston Athletic
Ass'n, 926 F.2d 42, 46 (1st Cir.1991).
232. 'The rules of the common law are continually changing and expanding with the
progress of the society in which it prevails. It does not lag behind, but adapts itself to
the conditions of the present so that the ends of justice may be reached.'. .. Specifically,
this court has long recognized that the concept of 'property' is not static but changes to
accommodate creative developments and novel legal relationships. (Citations omitted)
Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 603 P.2d 425 (Cal., 1979). (Suit was brought by the widow and
surviving son of the movie actor Bela Lugosi, who played the title role in the 1930 film
Dracula, seeking to recover profits made by defendant movie company in its licensing of the
use of the Count Dracula character to commercial firms and to enjoin defendant from making
any additional grants without plaintiffs' consent. The Supreme Court held that the right to
exploit name and likeness is personal to the artist and must be exercised, if at all, by him
during his lifetime.)
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The courts have refused to immunize the unpermitted use of the celeb-
rity persona on games and posters from infringement of the right of pub-
licity. The cases have held that this use is not immunized by the First
Amendment. Basically, the argument is that the use of the name for the
dissemination of news is proper, but the use of the same information,
"for the purpose of capitalizing upon the name by using it in conjunction
with a commercial product is not." 3
But, books or magazines are also a 'commercial' product that one
uses to distribute stories or gossip instead of selling them by loose paper.
Society, as a whole, also capitalizes on books. If the game is written in
book format, then it would escape infringement. Some commentators
have argued that these cases are incorrectly decided because the courts
were influenced, "by the untraditional conception of board games as me-
dia." 4 However, the publicity value of the person is not used to attract
attention to advertising, instead "the personalities become a part of the
product sold." 5 Games are also literary works and so they are given
copyright protection. When the topic of the game is a celebrity, the game
offers useful data on the life or achievements of the star. Trivia games, in
this sense, are mostly didactic, as one learns at the same time one that is
playing.3 6
233. Palmer v. Schonhorn Enterprises Inc., 232 A.2d 458 (1967) (Action by well-known
professional golfers seeking an injunction and damages with respect to use of their names by
defendant corporation in conjunction with a part of a game. The Superior Court held that
defendant corporation, which used names of plaintiffs in connection with golf game, should
not be permitted to commercialize or exploit or capitalize upon such names or upon their
reputation or accomplishments merely because such accomplishments had been highly publi-
cized, and fact that plaintiffs' names were not advertised on lids of game box, so that pur-
chaser would not know who the '23 famous golfers' were until he purchased and saw the
contents, would not mean that plaintiffs' rights of privacy were not invaded. Judgment for
plaintiffs).
See also Uhlaender v. Henricksen, 316 F. Supp. 1277 (D. Minn. 1970) (Injunction against a
board game that used names of professional baseball players); Rosemont Enter. Inc. v. Urban
Sys., Inc, 340 N.Y.S.2d 144 (Supp. Ct. 1973) (Summary judgment for plaintiff Howard Hughes
against the unpermitted use of his name and persona in the 'Howard Hughes' game).
234. Sims, supra note 190, at 494.
235. Treece, supra note 167, at 666.
236. Moreover, even if less common mediums of expression were to receive less First
Amendment protection (perhaps out of concern for whether they contain any expres-
sion at all), trading cards do not fall into that category. Baseball cards have been an
important means of informing the public about baseball players for over a century.
'Trading, collecting and learning about players are the most common reasons for chil-
dren to purchase baseball cards... They are, in other words, an education in base-
ball.'.. .'In addition, non-sports trading cards have also been an important medium for
disseminating information.' (Citations omitted).
Cardtoons, 95 F.3d at 969.
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It is the position of this paper, along with these commentators, that
courts are influenced by the traditional conceptions in a physical world
of atoms where speech is regarded as words and speech products are just
those carrying words. In this context, a board game, which is mainly
picture-based, is regarded as a non-speech product. Pictures, because of
their infrequent use as communication, have lagged behind as a proper
means of speech (only in some fields like advertising where images were
pervasive was it recognized that "a picture is worth a thousand words").
One main advance in the digital media has been to bring forward the use
of graphics to communicate at the same level as word-based speech. The
web allows not only advertisers or traditional mass media, but anyone, to
fully communicate by words, images, and sounds. Influenced by tradi-
tional misconception, one may think of graphics as a non-speech format,
and their use as blatant violations, while the same uses are permitted for
word-based messages."
Web games use graphics, sound, and video files, taking full advantage
of the speech possibilities of a digital medium. So, what is the difference
with a magazine that writes gossip about celebrities? They are both fac-
tual information that entertains. Also, most of the games on the web can
be played for free. But, suppose that some of them started charging a
minimal amount of cents per game ('e-cash'), what would be the com-
modity here? It is the position of this article that trivia, as much as
magazines, just capitalize on their infotainment function. 3
It is important to note that news gathering has been found to be a
permissible use of the public persona. The case that involved the use, by
a newspaper conducting a profit making survey over a 900 number, of
the names of the members of the group New Kids on the Block without
permission, shows a permissible use of the public persona. The court
held that this use was not an infringement because it was related to news
gathering, and not mere commercial exploitation 3 9 This decision has
been considered to permit the profitable activity of newsrooms that ex-
ploit the identity of celebrities. One could argue that these databases on-
237. "[A]s to non political figures, board games and wall posters featuring these celebri-
ties are not traditional media in which ideas are conveyed and should usually be viewed as
more exploitative than informational or educational." McCARTHY, supra note 81, at§ 7.7[C]
(Release # 16, 6/96).
238. "Cardtoons' trading cards, however, are not commercial speech-they do not merely
advertise another unrelated product. Although the cards are sold in the marketplace, they are
not transformed into commercial speech merely because they are sold for profit." Cardtoons,
95 F.3d at 970, quoting Virginia State Bd. of Phannacy, 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
239. New Kids On The Block, 971 F.2d 302 (9th Cir. 1992).
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line are just facts and news gathered by using the name of the celebrity
with an entertainment purpose.
If games were considered speech products, protected by the First
Amendment, the use of the name as a title for trivia games would be a
permissible use,24 ° since the name has artistic relevance to the content of
the game. It would not be considered to be a false designation under the
Lanham Act, Section 43 (a), because the title is not explicitly misleading
as to lack of connection with the game.
4. Advertising on the web
a) Advertising Web Sites, Newsgroups Or Other Speech Products
This section addresses the use of the celebrity, in advertising, for on-
line content, such as web sites, newsgroups, bulletin boards, etc. The cur-
rent forms of the advertisement can range from an ad in print media or a
broadcasted commercial, to an on-line ad, like the banners used as part
of most commercial web sites. The focus of this section is on the use of a
celebrity's name or image to advertise a speech product about the celeb-
rity as opposed to a collateral commercial product that would exploit the
image of the celebrity to attract sales. This latter unauthorized use is
analyzed in the next section. The analogy, for the purpose of the current
section, is the use of the celebrity in advertisements for books,
magazines, newspapers, movies, and any other kind of infotainment
work.
The United States Supreme Court has held that advertisements, for
First Amendment protected activities, are not considered commercial
speech and thus they qualify for First Amendment protection. 241 Also,
the California Supreme Court, has described the advertisement, for a
constitutionally protected television docudrama, as a continuum of the
film. 242
240. "Much useful social and commercial discourse would be all but impossible if speak-
ers were under threat of an infringement lawsuit every time they made reference to a person,
company or product by using its trademark." Id. at 307.
241. Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60 (1983).
242. It would be illogical to allow respondents to exhibit the film but effectively pre-
clude any advance discussion or promotion of their lawful enterprise. Since the use of
Valentino's name and likeness in the fim was not an actionable infringement of Valen-
tino's right of publicity, the use of his identity in advertisements for the film is similarly
not actionable.
Guglielmi, 603 P.2d at 462.
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The same applies when the name and picture of the person, who is
the subject of a biography, is used in advertising for that publication. It is
exempt from the right of publicity:
Had defendants merely used plaintiff's name in the Advertise-
ment, that use would clearly fall within the incidental use excep-
tion.. .The fact that the Advertisement also contained [plaintiff's]
photograph, which defendants concede does not appear in the
Book, cannot transform a privileged use in to an unlawful [one]
because the goal of the Advertisement -to inform potential
readers about the contents of the Book and induce them to
purchase it- remains unchanged.243
This is not different from the AL web site.2' It started as an informa-
tional web site that incidentally offered the possibility of purchasing
Dean's biography. The web site is analogous to the advertisement for a
book that includes interesting facts or quotes from the biography, and
perhaps a good photo of the star. More generally, web sites, set up for
the sole purpose of selling a speech product, are not infringements of the
right of publicity.
A New York Court, in Stern v. Delphi, held that because, "Stem's
name was used by Delphi to elicit public debate on Stem's candidacy,
logically the subsequent use of Stem's name and likeness in the adver-
tisement is afforded the same protection as would be afforded a more
traditional news disseminator engaged in the advertisement of a news-
worthy product. ' 245 This last decision is very important since it implies
that bulletin boards, such as the one on Stem, are newsworthy.
In advertising for 'speech works,' liability could arise if the advertis-
ing untruthfully implies that the person actually endorses or approves of
the publication. For example, if a fan called her web site the 'official
Madonna site' when the star did not actually endorse the site, it could be
deemed to be false advertising.246 But, this is independent of the use of
243. Groden v. Random House Inc., 35 U.S.P.Q.2d 1547, 1550 (2nd Cir. 1995) (Author
brought action against publisher and second author alleging Lanham Act and state law claims
based on advertisement for second author's book which incorporated plaintiff author's picture
and quote from his book. Both books were about JFK's assassination - whether it was the
work of a gunman or the result of a conspiracy. The Court of Appeals held that the use of
plaintiffs name, picture, and quotation was permissible "incidental use" under state statute
prohibiting use, for advertising or trade purposes, of name, portrait, or picture of any living
person without that person's consent. Summary judgment for defendants affirmed by Court of
Appeals.)
244. See supra notes 1 & 2.
245. Delphi, 626 N.Y.S.2d at 698.
246. Cher v. Forum Intl. Ltd., 692 F.2d 634, 213 U.S.P.Q. 96 (9th Cir. 1982) (Celebrity
brought action against free-lance writer who had conducted an interview with her and against
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Madonna's picture as part of the ad for the web site. The use itself is
legitimate as part of an informational product, and would not infringe
upon Madonna's right of publicity.24 7
b) Ad Banners For Advertising of Collateral Products
Ad banners are pervasive on the web. The main source of revenue
for commercial web sites248 comes precisely from ad space sold in top or
bottom banners. The banner usually includes a graphic, sometimes
animated, and a short phrase. It should grab the attention of the user
who is expected to click on the ad which will link the user to the adver-
tiser's web site. This is how marketing works on the web - not very
different from the billboards on the street or the ads in a magazine.
When an ad features a celebrity endorsing a product, this is when the
right of publicity comes into play.
Under the current case law, the unpermitted use of human identity,
in the commercial context of advertising or on commercial products
themselves, triggers infringement of the right of publicity or invasion of
the appropriation type of privacy. In most cases, liability will not contra-
vene constitutional protection given to "commercial speech." The
seller's right to disseminate information about the product remains safe,
but she will have to pay the celebrity for the use of her image to drive
magazines which had published the interview. The Court of Appeals held that the writer who
had made no promises of interviewee approval rights and who had not participated with the
publishers could not be held liable; the celebrity was not damaged by one magazine's assert-
edly exaggerated claims of exclusivity; magazines were entitled to inform their readers that
various issues contained articles about the celebrity; but the magazine appropriated the right
of publicity by falsely indicating that celebrity had told it things that she would not tell a rival
magazine and by falsely indicating that she endorsed the magazine.)
247. While the New Kids have a limited property right in their name, that right does
not entitle them to control their fans' use of their own money. Where, as here, the use
does not imply sponsorship or endorsement, the fact that it is carried on for profit and
in competition with the trademark holder's business is beside the point... But the
trademark laws do not give the New Kids the right to channel their fans' enthusiasm
(and dollars) only into items licensed or authorized by them. (Citations omitted).
New Kids On The Block, 971 F.2d at 309.
248. "Advertising on the Internet has reached an estimated $200 million on an annualized
basis, and analysts said they see that figure growing as the industry matures." Advertising:
More Venues, Targeted Ads, YAHoo NEws, Mar. 14, 1997 (visited Mar. 4, 1997) <http:l
vww.yahoo.com/headlines/970314/tech/stories/adsl.html>. "Advertising on the Internet
continues to record rapid growth, almost doubling every quarter. A report from the Internet
Advertising Bureau says spending on various Web advertisements in the fourth quarter of
1996 hit a record $109.5 million." Advertisers Increase Web Buys ,YAHoo NEws, Mar. 26, 1997
(visited Mar. 26, 1997) <http:/lwww.yahoo.comlheadlines/970326/techlstories/ads_4.html>.
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attention to her products. After all, the star's name will provide her with
extra sales.
The problem comes with mixing uses such as news, fiction, and ad-
vertising. One approach to the problem is to consider Which is the main
message of the ad. If the main use is commercial, then it will infringe the
right of publicity. Parody was tried as a defense by Samsung in Vanna
White's case in the Ninth Circuit, but it was rejected.249 Samsung tried
to build a humorous representation into an advertisement of VCRs.5 0
The court held that the parody was not relevant to the main content of
the ad which was "buy Samsung VCRs." 1 This decision has been very
polemic? 2 and criticized by both the doctrine and later courts.
McCarthy calls attention to the celebrity's constitutional right not to
be forced to speak or to permit one's property to be used as a vehicle for
the political or social message of another5 3 Then, advertisers, who
claim the right to parody the celebrity as part of an advertisement, can-
not force the celebrity to put her identity at the service of the adver-
tiser 4 On the contrary, Madow points out that advertisements are the
essence of pop culture and therefore, the right of publicity should not
censor advertising when it is a mere parody, satire, or cartoon of a celeb-
rity's likeness. 5
249. White, 989 F.2d at 1512.
250. Id.
251. Id.
252. The panel's opinion is a classic case of overprotection. Concerned about what it
sees as a wrong done to Vanna White, the panel majority erects a property right of
remarkable and dangerous breadth: Under the majority's opinion, it's now a tort for
advertisers to remind the public of a celebrity. Not to use a celebrity's name, voice,
signature or likeness; not to imply the celebrity endorses a product; but simply to
evoke the celebrity's image in the public's mind. This Orwellian notion withdraws far
more from the public domain than prudence and common sense allow. It conflicts with
the Copyright Act and the Copyright Clause. It raises serious First Amendment
problems. It's bad law, and it deserves a long, hard second look. (emphasis added).
White, 989 F.2d at 1514.
253. McCARHY, supra note 81, § 8.11[B][2], at 8-84.
254. See generally id.
255. See dissent in Vanna White:
It impoverishes the public domain, to the detriment of future creators and the public at
large. Instead of well-defined, limited characteristics such as name, likeness or voice,
advertisers will now have to cope with vague claims of 'appropriation of identity,'
claims often made by people with a wholly exaggerated sense of their own fame and
significance.. .Future Vanna Whites might not get the chance to create their personae,
because their employers may fear some celebrity will claim the persona is too similar to
her own... The public will be robbed of parodies of celebrities, and our culture will be
deprived of the valuable safety valve that parody and mockery create. (Citations
omitted).
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The Vanna White case should not have the effect of preventing adver-
tisers from employing certain marketing techniques that merely invoke
the memory of a celebrity, such as his or her style of dress or common
surroundings. The decision is likely to have some chilling effect on the
speech of advertisers.
Recovery should be limited to instances in which an advertiser
truly has misappropriated the identity of a celebrity by using his
or her name or likeness to market a product. It is only then that
an actionable appropriation has occurred. [A]dvertisers would
need to consult a lawyer every time they used an element of pop-
ular culture in their advertisements, for fear of reminding the con-
sumer of a particular person. This would stifle advertiser
creativity and expression."5 6
5. Computer Simulations as "Look-alike" and "Sound-alike"
Have you heard the story of Kyoko, the first computer-generated pop
star? This sixteen-year-old girl has released a series of successful singles
in Japan and will be giving video concerts and appearing in commercials
in the near future."5 7 This is what computer generated imaging can do.
Kyoko is a star that has been created from scratch. But, the similar tech-
niques used to build her could be employed to reproduce the body and
voice of an existing celebrity. The result would be a 'look-alike' and
'sound-alike' digital persona. Will these fake avatars compete with the
real celebrity? The technology is not here yet. The question is whether
the protection that the law provides today, to performers, athietes, and
other celebrities will also work on-line?" 8 When answering this question
one should take into account the fair use and First Amendment excep-
tions which must be recognized and expanded to novel applications, such
as on-line chatting, using stars' avatars, or 3-D environments 59
Id. at 1516-17.
256. Paul Cirino, Advertisers, Celebrities, and Publicity Rights in New York and California,
39 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv 763, 798-99 (1994).
257. Richard Kadrey, (Im) Material Girl, WIRED 5.03, Mar. 1997 (visited March 27, 1997)
<http:/iwww.wired.comlwiredl5.03/eword.html>.
258. See generally, Joseph J. Beard, Casting Call at Forest Lawn: The Digital Resurrection
of Deceased Entertainers - A 21st Century Challenge for Intellectual Property Law, 8 HIGI
TECH. L.J. 101 (1993).
259. The new medium of multi-user virtual worlds allows ordinary Internet users to
interact as 'avatars' in real time in shared 2 and 3D graphical spaces. Avatar virtual
worlds are fast changing the notion of the net from 'interface' to 'place.' These worlds
include vast 3D cityscapes reminiscent of the Metaverse in Stephenson's 'Snow Crash'
to virtual bazaars full of traders in exotic objects to voice enabled worlds hosting avatar
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On the Internet, these kind of sound-alikes and look-alikes are more
likely to appear. Digital sound and image reproduction are within some
keystrokes. One can set up her own web site, start manipulating pictures
and sound files of famous people or their impersonators, and post them
on-line. The right of publicity would not be infringed as long as these
uses are not for the purpose of trade. A different issue is copyright in-
fringement, which might occur with digital sampling or morphing real
photos of the rich and famous.
On-line and CD-ROM entertainment provide new ways to exploit
the celebrity's persona for commercial gains. The use of live talent adds
value to these interactive products. For instance, CD-ROM games like
John Madden's Football use real sports celebrities. 60 Live persons can
be used to create the digital double of the inaccessible star. Computer
generated imagery (CGI) allows one to transform and manipulate a per-
son's image, e.g., morphing somebody's face, transposing somebody's
head on somebody else's body, and manipulating voices or sounds. Soci-
ety is entering a new era of digital advertising, where these types of elec-
tronic imaging techniques will be more pervasive and thus the right of
publicity will become more prevalent. The existing doctrine of 'look-
alikes' and 'sound-alikes' is broad enough to deal with most of these on-
line uses. This article will proceed by first describing the uses for com-
mercial purposes that harm the star's image, and then wil analyze the
use for infotainment purposes which harm the performance value of the
star more than her image.
The right of publicity can be infringed upon by unpermitted commer-
cial use of such aspects of the persona as vocal style, instrumental sound
style, and performing style. These uses are the so called "look-alikes" or
"sound-alikes." An imitation of style, for advertising purposes, usually
implies an active imitation, but it can also be a still picture, audio tape,
or film of the celebrity or her impersonator. The imitation need not be
human it can be an animated cartoon - remember the White case. The
test for triggering the right of publicity is if the plaintiff celebrity is iden-
tifiable in the advertisement by imitation of her name, voice, mannerism,
glee clubs. Currently 350,000 users access virtual worlds using ordinary home com-
puters with dial-up connections and no special hardware.
Bruce Darner, co-founder of Contact Consortium - a force to build community in Avatar
Cyberspace. For an overview of the 'avatar' virtual world medium, see <http://vww.ccon.org>
& <http:/lwww.nmr.banffcentre.ab.ca/htmprogramslmmi981HTMl986mil9.htm>.
260. Nancy Malitz, Football forever: Snazzy video games and the Net keep fans sacking the
quarterback all year, DETorr NEWS, Jan. 23, 1997, at D10.
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or even accompanying objects.2 6 1 The rationale used in those cases is
exactly the same as those used for unauthorized advertising to endorse a
collateral product. Basically, these uses can affect the plaintiff by over-
exposing and projecting a different image than intended.
A picture alone can be enough to identify a person and thus consti-
tute the unauthorized use of somebody's persona. Typically advertisers
have tried ingenious ways of avoiding infringement of the right of public-
ity or privacy, without much success. These kinds of uses have been em-
bodied under the 'look-alike' doctrine.262 Traditionally, 'look-alikes'
referred to the use of a model, identical to the celebrity, for advertising
261. In most cases an appropriation of identity is accomplished through the use of a
person's name or likeness... In the abscence of a narrower statutory definition, a
number of cases have held that unauthorized use of other indicia of a person's identity
can infringe upon the right of publicity .. if they are so closely and uniquely associated
with the identity of a particular individual that their use enables the defendant to ap-
propriate the commercial value of the person's identity. Whether the plaintiff is identi-
fied by the defendant's use is a question of fact. Relevant evidence includes the nature
and extent of the identifying characteristics used by the defendant, the defendant's in-
tent, the fame of the plaintiff, evidence of actual identification made by third persons,
and surveys or other evidence indicating the perceptions of the audience.
RESTATEMENT (THiRD) OF m LAW OF UNFAIR COMPETITION 46, cmt. d (1995). See for
example, Carson v. Here's Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831 (6th Cir. 1983) (Johnny
Carson's right of publcity infringed by defendant's use of the phrase "Here's Johnny" in con-
nection with the sale of portable toilets); Motschenbacher v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 498
F. 2d 821 (9th Cir. 1974) (Motschenbacher's identity misappropriated by defendant's use of
plaintiff's distinctively decorated racing car in an advertisement); Midler v. Ford Motor Co.,
849 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1988) & Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093(9th Cir. 1992) (plaintiffs
common law right of publicity was infringed by the use of a "sound-alike" to imitate the
singers' voices in product commercials) & White, 984 F.2d 1512, (White's common law right of
publicity infringed by the use of a robot that evoked White in her role as hostess of the Wheel
of Fortune game show.) Professor Halpern notes that
there was no question in Carson, Motschenbacher, Midler or Waits that the defendant
was blatantly attempting not merely to 'remind' recipients of the communication of the
celebrity or vaguely to conjure up his or her image; the point of the activity was ex-
pressly to associate the individual's identity with the defendant's product as clearly as if
a 'name' or 'likeness' had been used. .. 'the issue really is that of distinguishing appro-
priation of associate value from that from mere evocation.'
Halpern, supra note 176, at 863.
Identifiability should mean more than that the defendant's usage merely hints at the
plaintiff or does no more than remind the viewer of the plaintiff. Thus, it should not be
an infringment if advertiser merely uses a genre of character, even though it might
remind some viewers of an actor that once played such a character. The law has yet to
define clearly the line between infringing 'identification' on the one hand and nonin-
fringing 'reminders' and 'hints' on the other hand.
See McCARTHY, supra note 81, § 3.2.
262. Onassis v. Christian Dior- New York, Inc., 122 Misc.2d 603, 472 N.Y.S.2d 254
(N.Y.Supp., 1984).
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purposes without the permission of the celebrity.2 63 Nobody escapes
from liability by using a model as a substitute for the original.264 Another
'look-alike' infringement, is the use of a star's picture that was taken
years before.2 65 But, the courts have held that the person is entitled to
recover whether her actual appearance has been altered through the pas-
sage of time.266 Also, Playgirl magazine tried to get around the 'look-
alike' problem by using a Muhammed Ali illustration which fell some-
where in between picture and cartoon.2 67 The court recognized that the
New York statute's reference to 'portrait or picture' encompasses any
visual representation where the likeness of the celebrity is recogniza-
ble.268 The California statute defines broadly the term 'photograph' and
requires that the person is 'readily identifiable' in the sense that one who
views the picture, with the naked eye, can reasonably determine that the
person depicted is the same as the one complaining.2 69 Plaintiffs, in addi-
tion to a right of publicity claim for unauthorized use in advertising, may
allege false advertisement and general deception.
263. Id.
264. Id (Jacqueline Kennedy-Onassis sued Christian Dior for using an Onassis look-alike
in a commercial featuring other famous celebrities. The court interpreted the word "portrait"
in the New York privacy statute to include a picture of another person designed to "convey
the idea that it was the plaintiff." Despite the limited language of the statute, the court con-
cluded that Onassis' "portrait" had been appropriated because the look-alike was a good im-
postor and the presence of other celebrities would foster a belief that Onassis actually
appeared in the commercial.)
265. See, Negri v. Schering Corp., 333 F. Supp. 101 (S.D. N.Y. 1971).
266. Id. at 101 (Movie actress brought action against advertiser under New York statute
for use of a person's name for advertising purposes without that person's consent. The District
Court held that a nine-inch-high, full-length likeness of plaintiff, with features that were clear
and characteristic, was recognizable despite the fact that the picture had been taken over 40
years previously, and the use of the picture was for "advertising purposes," even if the plain-
tiff's identity was irrelevant to what the advertisement was trying to sell, where the picture was
not only used to catch the eye and focus it on the advertisement but plaintiff was depicted as
actually recommending the product, the first four letters of which spelled the plaintiff's first
name. Plaintiff's motion granted; defendant's cross motion denied.)
267. Ali v. Playgirl, Inc., 447 F.Supp. 723, (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (Action was brought by former
heavyweight boxing champion for injunctive relief and damages in connection with allegedly
unauthorized printing, publication and distribution of an objectionable portrait of the former
champion in a magazine. On motion for preliminary injunction, the District Court held that:
plaintiff had established probable success on merits for claimed violation of privacy under
New York law; plaintiff would likely also prevail on his claim that his right of publicity had
been violated by publication of offensive portrait; plaintiff made sufficient showing of irrepa-
rable injury, and preliminary injunction would extend to restrain publisher's activities with
respect to all copies of magazines containing disputed portrait in England as well as New
York. Preliminary injunction issued.)
268. Id. at 726-27.
269. CAL. CIV. CODE, § 334 (West 1998).
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Even unauthorized use in the media has triggered liability. Esquire
magazine reprinted the head of a photo of actor Cary Grant which was
used in a previous issue of the same magazine, superimposed on a body
of a model with an up-to-date outfit. 7 The court disregarded the fact
that it was an article on clothing trends, and found for plaintiff.27' "The
First Amendment does not absolve movie companies or publishers from
the obligation of paying their help. They are entitled to photograph a
newsworthy event but they are not entitled to convert unsuspecting citi-
zens into unpaid professional actors."' Since the photo was published
to attract attention to an article, unrelated to Grant, the identifiable star
had a right to be paid for the commercial value of his modeling or acting
services.
"Sound-alikes" are the equivalent of the "look-alikes" but, as the
name indicates, refer to the use of celebrities' distinct vocal styles or
instrumental sounds. However, courts have been more reluctant to rec-
ognize publicity rights on voice than publicity rights on likeness. Since
the Bette Midler decision in 1988, the courts have upheld the right of a
recording artist to assert infringement of the right of publicity for the
unpermitted use of a 'sound-alike' imitator in a commercial advertise-
ment.2 73 The same result was granted to singer Tom Waits for the use of
a 'sound-alike' in a Frito-Lay commercial. Imitation of recorded vocal
sounds may raise the question of federal copyright protection.274 How-
ever, the Ninth Circuit has held that there is no preemption since the
right of publicity and copyright law protect different interests. "A voice
is not copyrightable. What is put forward as protectable here is more
270. Grant, 367 F. Supp. at 877.
271. Id. at 878-79.
272. Id. at 878. (Plaintiff brought action against magazine publisher and clothing seller for
libel, invasion of right to privacy and violation of right of publicity arising from use of photo-
graph of plaintiff's head on torso of model in connection with magazine article dealing with
clothing styles. The District Court held that the publication was not libelous but that the First
Amendment did not preclude recovery under New York Civil Rights Law for use of plaintiff's
photograph without compensation if photograph was used for purposes of advertising or for
the purposes of trade.)
273. "[The] three elements of the Midler tort [are]: the deliberate misappropriation for
commercial purposes of (1) a voice, that is (2) distinctive and (3) widely known." Waits, 978
F.2d at 1100.
274. With the advent of digital sampling, the infringement is made easier without even the
need of a human impersonator. See Bruce J. McGiverin, Digital Sound Sampling, Copyright
and Publicity: Protecting Against The Electronic Appropriation of Sounds, 87 COLUM. L. REv
1723 (1987) (Arguing for the right of publicity as a protection for musicians against plagiarism
of their works).
[Vol. 8:289
THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY ON THE INTERNET
personal than any work of authorship. A voice is as distinctive and per-




Apart from the advertising context, infringement of the right of pub-
licity can also occur when using 'look-alikes' or 'sound-alikes' for alter-
native infotainment products that try to substitute the impersonator for
the original. These kind of uses harm the performance value of a celeb-
rity, rather than her image. For instance, 'look-alikes' comprise the use
of an actor's role or characterization that is closely identified with that
star. If this use is for profit activities, then liability may arise. The obvi-
ous case is the use of a character that has been created from scratch by
the celebrity as were the cases of Charlie Chaplin, the Marx Brothers,
and the duo of Laurel and Hardy. 76 Here it is clear that the actor is
exclusively identified by the character. A less obvious case is when actors
play a role or character that has been created by an author, usually as
part of a written work. In such cases, it is the owner of the copyright, in
the characterization, who owns commercial rights to the character or
role, and the actor that plays the role usually does not have a publicity
right over the character.27 7 The only exception is when the actor is per-
ceived as being synonymous with the character, then the character is
considered to be part of the persona as property of that actor. Thus,
these cases become a mere question of fact as to the public identification
of the celebrity.27 Characterizations may also be protected from com-
275. Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460, 462-63 (9th Cir. 1988).
276. I do not suggest that an actor can never retain a proprietary interest in a charac-
terization. An original creation of a fictional figure played exclusively by its creator
may well be protectable. (Goldstein v. California (1973) 412 U.S. 546, 93 S.Ct. 2303,37
L.Ed.2d 163.) Thus Groucho Marx just being Groucho Marx, with his mustache, cigar,
slouch and leer, cannot be exploited by others. Red Skelton's variety of self-devised
roles would appear to be protectable, as would the unique personal creations of Ab-
bott and Costello, Laurel and Hardy and others of that genre. Indeed the court in a
case brought by the heirs of Stanley Laurel and Oliver Hardy (Price v. Hal Roach
Studios, Inc. (S.D.N.Y.1975) 400 F.Supp. 836) observed at page 845: 'we deal here with
actors portraying themselves and developing their own characters. . .' Here it is clear
that Bela Lugosi did not portray himself and did not create Dracula, he merely acted
out a popular role that had been garnished with the patina of age, as had innumerable
other thespians over the decades.
Lugosi, 603 P.2d at 432.
277. Id. at 431.
278. While originality plays a role, a court should also consider the association with the
real life actor. Where an actor's screen persona becomes so associated with him that it
becomes inseparable from the actor's own public image, the actor obtains an interest in
the image which gives him standing to prevent mere interlopers using it without
authority.
1998]
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mercial exploitation through other legal doctrines such as service mark
infringement, false advertising, or general "passing off."2 79
Computer animation permits the making of a movie or other en-
tertainment work without real actors s0 by using their clone representa-
tions. This poses new spins on the right of publicity. While the right of
publicity protects the commercial use of the persona in advertising con-
texts, the uncertainty rests more on the protection of the performance
values of the celebrity. It should not be a difficult solution that the ce-
lebrity has to authorize a scanning of her body in order to be repro-
duced. Therefore, she would be compensated for this service. The
problem comes with further uses of the computer generated image than
those first intended by the celebrity. An instance of this is the Pesina
case.
Mr. Pesina is a martial artist. The defendants are in various ways
involved in the creation, manufacture, marketing, and distribution
of home video games, Mortal Kombat and Mortal Kombat II, and
related products. The Midway defendants created the games and
hold their copyrights. There are coin- operated arcade and home
versions of the games. In 1991, 1992, and 1993, Mr. Pesina was
hired to model for characters of the coin-operated arcade Mortal
Kombat and Mortal Kombat II. His movements were either vide-
otaped or captured by a computer, and after an extensive editing
process, incorporated into the games. The Midway defendants li-
censed Acclaim to sell the coin-operated arcade games in the
home video market. Acclaim created the home version of Mortal
Kombat and Mortal Kombat II by reformatting the coin-operated
arcade software to render it compatible with media used in the
home, the process being analogous to formatting a motion picture
for VCR viewing. Acclaim also adopted Mortal Kombat and Mor-
tal Kombat II for home use on the game systems designed by
Nintendo and Sega, who, in turn, manufactured the games ac-
cording to Acclaim's specifications.
McFarland v. Miller, 14 F.3d 912, 920 (3rd Cir. 1994) (the widow of actor George "Spanky"
McFarland continued lawsuit against restaurant which had identical name to movie character
played by actor.)
279. Service marks: Apple Corps. Ltd. v. Adirondack Group, 476 N.Y.S.2d 716 (1983);
False advertising: Allen v. National Video, Inc., 610 F. Supp. 612 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); Passing-off:
Sinatra v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 435 F.2d 711 (9th Cir. 1970).
280. "Mr. Pesina was hired to model for characters of the coin-operated arcade Mortal
Kombat and Mortal Kombat II. His movements were either videotaped or captured by a
computer, and, after an extensive editing process, incorporated into the games." Pesina v.
Midway Mfg. Co., 948 F.Supp. 40, 42 (N.D.III, 1996).
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In his complaint, Mr. Pesina alleges that all defendants used
his persona, name, and likeness without authorization in the
home version of Mortal Kombat and Mortal Kombat II and the
related products, thereby infringing his common law right of
publicity.28'
The court granted summary judgment on this count for the defendant
because,
to prevail on this theory.. .Mr. Pesina would have to show that his
identity became 'inextricably intertwined' in the public mind with
[the character] Johnny Cage. This Mr. Pesina cannot do since the
evidence shows that Mr. Pesina is not a widely known martial art-
ist and the public does not even recognize him as a model for
Johnny Cage. 2
It is the position of this paper that this case was not correctly decided.
The court analogized the use of Pesina's clone to the use of an actor's
character in a different entertainment work. The difference is that the
clone is Pesina himself. In this case his movements and his dimensions
were all carefully imitated. As opposed to a character who adds some
talented performance of value, Pesina was the skeleton of his cloned
character. The clone is so much a part of his persona that the require-
ment of identifiability used for characterizations is meaningless here.
The test should be different because Pesina should be entitled to author-
ize subsequent uses of his clone.8 3 The Pesina case should have been
decided as if there had been a misappropriation of Pesina's voice or like-
ness. Then the holding would have supported the plaintiff's right of pub-
licity on his persona.
Meanwhile, the best bet is that the Pesinas of the world can carefully
retain their publicity right when drafting their contracts by limiting the
use of their clones to the uses specified in the contract. There should be a
comprehensive right of publicity that should protect all aspects intrinsic
to a person's identity, including scanned body movements. In such way, a
celebrity would control the use of her persona within her field of profes-
sion. Only educational, satiric, and incidental uses ought to escape in-
fringement on the right of publicity.
This is the main threat that computer simulations pose to performers'
rights, especially when these performers are not well-known. The current
281. Id. at 41-42.
282. Id. at 42-43.
283. Users who have played the game often commented about the fact that the game is
based on real characters and looked upon the characters the same way most people look at
movie stars, etc.
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case law requires the identification element which is not easy to meet
when the use involves not yet famous performers, or even worse, does
not involve their faces, but instead involves other personal features of
their personas, such as their bodies, movements, or what have you. 284
The statutory and common right of publicity that claim to protect the
public persona should include other aspects, that, although less recogniz-
able than the name, voice, or likeness, do damage the performance value
of would-be stars.
More traditional types of infringement in case law include imitations
of performers by talented impersonators. An imitator trying to "pass
off" as the original person is too obvious an exploitation and infringe-
ment to create any controversy. More common is the imitative perform-
ance of charismatic characterizations. Various bodies of the law
(copyright law, misappropriation law, service mark infringement, false
advertising, or general passing off) provide protection against this type
of infringement. 5
Sometimes the impersonation involves the imitation of a characteri-
zation with an impersonator, like in the Chaplin case, where the film was
deceitfully distributed as "Charlie Aplin in the well-known character. ' 286
This type of use could be more abundant on the Internet due to the ease
of the distribution. Other times, characters are imitated in a different
media than the original one. For instance, the Lone Ranger cases in-
284. "We hold only that there exists at least a triable issue of fact as to whether [plaintiff]
McFarland had become so inextricably identified with spanky McFarland that McFarland's
own identity would be invoked by the name spanky." This "inextricability identified" test has
been used by later courts (See DeClemente v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 860 F. Supp. 30,
52-53 (E.D.N.Y. 1994), cited in Pesina v. Midway Mfg. Co., 948 F. Supp. 40, 42 (N.D.Ill.
1996)), adding to it the "widely known" requirement, present in the Midler test for voice
appropriation. But as McCarthy points out "[t]o establish liability, plaintiff need prove no
more than that he or she is reasonably identifiable in defendant's use to more than a de mini-
mus number of persons.. .Rather, the number of people who in fact identified plaintiff goes to
the extent of the remedy." McCARTHY, supra note 81, § 3.4[1B]. Otherwise, non-celebrities
would never be afforded a right of publicity claim.
285. See supra note 279; Copyright Law - music sampling: Jarvis v. A&M Records, 827
F. Supp. 282 (D.N.J. 1993); Misappropriation law: Ettore v. Philco Television Broadcasting
Corp., 229 F.2d 481 (3rd Cir. 1956).
286. Chaplin v. Amador, 93 Cal. App. 358 (1928) (The California Court of Appeals pro-
tected an actor's style and mannerisms with unfair competition law. Charles Amador ap-
peared in movies under the name "Charles Aplin" and imitated Charlie Chaplin's famous
character. Chaplin sued and received an injunction preventing Amador from making films
that imitated Chaplin's movies, style of dress, costume, or mannerisms. The court explained
that Chaplin's character enjoyed such immense fame that his identity was invoked by the
character, even without reference to Chaplin by name. The court reasoned that Amador
would deceive the public into believing Chaplin was the actor in the movie.)
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volved the use of the radio series in public performances by copying the
characteristic outfit and using the famous phrase, 'Hi ho, Silver.' 287 An-
other case is the famous Beattlemania case in 1986, wherein the Superior
Court, in Los Angeles, decided for the plaintiffs.288 The defendants had
performed live for three years and filmed a movie. The imitation was so
identical that the audience believed that they were watching the real
Beatles.289
These cases have in common an unauthorized use for the purposes of
competitive entertainment with the original. The amount of the taking is
substantial enough so as to interfere with the livelihood of the original
performer, as in Zacchini,2 91 thus this behavior is considered infringe-
ment upon the right of publicity. The rationale for protecting an original
performance, from its imitation in other types of media, is the same as in
copyright law, where adaptations are subject to authorization by the au-
thors.29 ' On the other hand, some argue that this kind of artistic achieve-
ment ought to be protected.292 First, most people will still prefer the
authentic Beatles. Second, competition and free-riding is allowed in
every kind of business when it does not falsely associate the celebrity
with some collateral good.
A different case occurs when the impersonator or imitator is used as
comedic or satiric entertainment. As long as the performance consists of
287. Lone Ranger, Inc. v. Currey, 79 F.Supp. 190 (M.D. Pa., 1948) (Action by the Lone
Ranger, Inc., against Earl W. Currey and Jack Smith for damages and injunctive relief because
of defendants' alleged unfair competition, unfair trade practices, and infringement of plain-
tiff's good will, trade-mark, trade-name, and copyrights, wherein defendants counterclaimed.
Judgment for plaintiff.)
288. Apple Corp. Ltd. v. Leber, 229 U.S.P.Q. 1015 (Super. Ct. CA 1986).
289. It's true that the mixed-media presentation was a top quality performance, organ-
ized, put together, and presented by some very highly talented and capable persons,
but such only provided the setting for what was a fantasy concern by persons who so
accurately imitated the Beettles in concert that the audience, according to contempo-
rary viewers, in great part suspended their disbelief and fell prey to the illusion that
they were actually viewing the Beettles in performance.
Apple Corp Ltd., 229 U.S.P.Q. at 1017.
290. Zacchini, 433 U.S. 562 (1977).
291. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Da Costa, 377 F.2d 315, 319 (1st Cir. 1967) (Ac-
tion against television network and others for misappropriating character and idea allegedly
created by plaintiff. The Court of Appeals held that even if plaintiff, by appearing in public as
character of early west and passing out cards which included the words 'Have Gun Will
Travel', conceived and created idea and character which were novel, original, and unique, and
plaintiff did not at any time abandon idea and character by a publication thereof, and defend-
ants copied idea and character without permission of plaintiff and used them in television
series, defendants were not liable to plaintiff for their alleged misappropriation of plaintiff's
character, in absence of undertaking by plaintiff to have cards copyrighted.)
292. Madow, supra note 76.
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a small takings, or a series of impressions, it will not trigger liability. It is
generally accepted that a humorous mimic, in a non-advertisement con-
text, does not infringe the right of publicity. These forms of entertain-
ment are well protected by the First Amendment. Copyright law
includes them as fair use since it does not chill the demand for the origi-
nal, but usually does quite the opposite. As the California Supreme
Court stated clearly in Gugliemi v. Universal City Studios, "The right of
publicity derived from public prominence does not confer a shield to
ward off caricature, parody and satire. Rather prominence invites crea-
tive comment. '293
The right of publicity analysis is never complete without considering
whether the presumptive uses fall under the First Amendment protected
exceptions. The Internet brings about novel possibilities of communica-
tion, like MUDs or 3-D environments. Users can dispose of the face,
body, or voices of stars for the purpose of interacting with others. The
use of the computer generated image or voice in these new contexts do
not harm publicity rights of the star. These are just private uses in com-
munication or 3-D environments where people meet and talk, where
there is no commercial use, but instead there is merely a communicative
function, by using a particular avatar. These 3-D environments are now
at their initial stages and are mainly for interacting with others for fun
and for free. A few of these virtual places are for profit, like virtual
Vegas for gambling. 94 These for profit sites may be the first ones to
stage unauthorized uses of celebrities' avatars. In the future, we will see
that 3-D environments will become a true replica of our off-line world -
resembling the Metaverse once described by sci-fi author Neal Stephen-
son.295 Then, new avenues for infringement of the right of publicity will
arise, mirroring the off-line types of infringement.
Actors can work with programmers to create algorithms that simu-
late their appearance and character. Then, they can license this persona
to whoever can pay for it, ranging from companies running interactive
commercials, to on-line events and personal interaction, etc. This process
also applies to totally artificial personas, people who are not around any
more (Marilyn Monroe, James Dean, Confucious, etc.) or people who
are considered to be mythological characters (Robin Hood, Genghis
Khan, etc.).
293, 603 P.2d at 460.
294. See <http://www.virtual.vegas.com>.
295. See <http:lvillage.vossret.co.uklp/paulflsnowcras.htm> (a site devoted to Stephen-
son's book SNOW CRASH which includes what he titles a "Metaverse" of virtual reality in the
future).
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In the case of deceased actors, the post mortem right of publicity
might be an obstacle for such uses. But, the weight of the interests being
balanced should not be the same as during the celebrity's life. On the
one hand, the First Amendment right of the public is generally rein-
forced, for the public interest in making comment or parody on deceased
performances is even greater than during their lives. On the other hand,
the damage to the performance values of a deceased performer is much
less because there is no original whose livelihood is impaired. The right
of the heirs to prevent these alternative performances should be more
limited. In fact, these imitations would often renew the interest in the
deceased figure which would increase the sales of the celebrities' works
or memorabilia. Thus, these alternative performances should be pro-
tected from liability of post mortem publicity rights.2 96
Some commentators see these new technologies as a threat to the
livelihood of film stars. 97 This, however, is an alarmist view. The digital
revolution is changing some of the traditional concepts and a very im-
296. The digital age is changing the meaning of time, space, speech and its value. Real
time, global, multi-media and bits are the key words. As Negroponte suggests, the importance
of the finished work diminishes as this work is immediately taken over into another work of
art and so forth. NIciiOrAs NEGROPONTE, BEING DirrA (1995). Then metaphysical ques-
tions need to be considered such as what's the value in time of a work of authorship, as it goes
away from the source. Second, we should question the rationale for a 50 year average post-
mortem period and what these post-mortem rights should protect.
Post mortem famous cases like the Elvis and the Marx brothers evidence the weakening
strength of the right of publicity when the celebrity is not alive. Memphis Dev. Found. v.
Factors Etc., Inc., 616 F. 2d 956 (6th Cir. 1980) (holding that under Tennessee law the right of
publicity does not survive death), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 953 (1980). Groucho Marx Prod, Inc..
689 F. 2d 317. The Court affirmed the position that only acts unrelated to a celebrity's career
should count as commercial exploitation, and further suggested that a survivable right would
protect only "products and services that the celebrity promoted with his name and likeness
during his lifetime."
In my opinion, postmortem rights should only apply to the advertising context or substan-
tial use of original performances. Endorsement of products by using the persona of the celeb-
rity ought to be always deemed infringement. There is no justification to associate the name of
a deceased person with a product, for the only purpose of increasing its sales. However, inci-
dental uses of the celebrity, as part of other performances or speech products, for building
new works, commentary or for parody should be permitted. Then, for policy reasons there
should be a post-mortem right on for-profit uses of the celebrity's persona limited to the first
20 years after the star's death. Just enough time to cover the first generation, not to foster a
non-deserving ongoing right for far-related artist's heirs. This period should run parallel to
copyright duration on the work so as not to create an obstacle for its use once the work is
copyright free (in the public domain) but still under a post-mortem right of publicity. Then,
the rights should go back to the public domain, for others to build upon them, except for
advertisement purposes.
297. See Pamela Lynn Kunath, Lights, Camera, Animate: The Right Of Publicity's Effect
On Computer-Animated Celebrities, 29 Loy. L.A.REv. 863 (1996) (Proposing a compulsory
licensing scheme).
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portant one is the value of information. Barlow describes this switch by
listing some of the characteristics of digital information. 98 One of them
is that information loses value the further it goes from its source.2 99 This
point helps to illustrate this article's proposition. First, computer simula-
tion lacks the spark of life and it will take at least a decade to achieve
almost perfect representations. Second, the avatar of Madonna will not
compete with the real Madonna. Technology is also allowing real time
interaction by real humans. The value in the future will be in real time
performances, not only as we understand them today, but also as collec-
tive real time experiences where only those who can pay the admission
ticket will have the privilege to enjoy a real time drama, comedy, or what
have you. Hollywood will not disappear, it will just go interactive. There-
fore, the solution is not to expand the legal blanket, but to walk hand in
hand with technology, so that regulation is only provided 'a posteriori'
when compelling private interests call for protection when weighed
against 'a priori' higher interest like free speech 00 Instead, the courts
should consider the original rationale of the right of publicity, to protect
the 'fruit of the labor,' and the value of performers, who like Pesina,
remain prey of the uncertainty of contract law.
C. Conclusion: Off-line Law Protects Fans On-line
The conclusion of this legal analysis is twofold. First, there is good
news for all those fans around the world with their web page or new-
sgroup on a celebrity. They do not infringe upon the star's right of pub-
licity. These infotainment uses of a celebrity's persona, without a tint of
advertisement, are covered by the First Amendment right of the speak-
ers. The Internet, as the quasi-perfect realization of the right to free
speech, is mostly an ongoing conversation, where web sites, newsgroups,
and the like, are no different than books, magazines, or chat. They are
speech in a digital media and as such have to get their way in this open
market place, with few permissible restrictions from the right of public-
ity. Only commercial advertising uses, 'look-alikes,' and 'sound-alikes,'
which compete with the original, will trigger liability on-line the same
way as they do off-line.
298. Barlow, supra note 71.
299. Id.
300. White, 989 F.2d at 1516. (Kozinski, J., dissenting from the order rejecting the sugges-
tion for rehearing en bane) ("Instead of well -defined, limited characteristics such as name,
likeness or voice, advertisers will now have to cope with vague claims of 'appropriation of
identity,' claims often made by people with a wholly exaggerated sense of their own fame and
significance.")
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Second, the current legal structure itself will be valid on-line, but its
application to the Internet will need to be carefully adjusted. If we want
to apply current law to the legal issues on the Internet, not only to the
right of publicity cases but, also to other regulations, it is critical that all
engaged in this task understand the nature of the Internet, the way it
works, and where it is going. Once this condition is fulfilled, society will
be in a position to solve on-line legal issues by analogy to the existing
case law. The trend started by some courts to extend the blanket of the
right over the mere evocation of a celebrity through even surrounding
objects is too far overreaching. The unsettled legal field on the Internet
should not give way to more stringent laws that will have a chilling effect
on this medium. Rather, the law has to be carefully adapted, respectful
of technology, and with the rationale behind common law rights, like the
right of publicity. Then, it should appear obvious that those perform-
ances by less well-known artists are the ones in need of legislative or
judicial protection in the new medium.
Computer animation and reproduction of personal features like body
shapes or movements, risk falling outside the traditional scope of the
right of publicity. New media will force courts to re-think whether the
personal attributes ought to be included within the protection of the
right of publicity, rather than the surrounding objects, extrinsic to a per-
son, that the Vanna White court included under an amorphous right of
publicity. After all, the right of publicity aims at protecting and promot-
ing the commercial value of one's identity, meaning personal attributes,
but not limited to name, face, voice, or signature.
V. POLICY ANALYSIS OF THE RIGHTr OF PUBLICITY
A. The Internet Dilemma: Regulation or Deregulation?
There is almost general agreement among cyberlawyers on the bene-
fits of a delay in regulating the Internet. The justification is the nature of
the medium. "When the primary articles of commerce in a society look
so much like speech as to be indistinguishable from it, and when the
traditional methods of protecting their ownership have become ineffec-
tual, attempting to fix the problem with broader and more vigorous en-
forcement will inevitably threaten freedom of speech." '' However, the
fast pace of the evolving technology, may make it unnecessary to regu-
late certain aspects of the on-line medium.
301. Barlow, supra note 71.
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The architecture of the Internet may serve, by itself, to achieve an
order that in the real world requires legal imposition,"2 which may be a
positive result given the high speed of technology advancement. Once
there is a clearer sense of the conditions of cyberspace, ideally the law
will come to ratify what is an accepted set of standards and social con-
ducts. "When societies develop outside the law, they develop their un-
written codes, practices, and ethical systems. While technology may
undo law, technology offers methods for restoring creative rights."303
Besides, the current problems on-line can generally be answered with
the existing legal systems, making the need for new laws less imperative.
B. Interests in Play: Centralized v. Decentralized Meaning Making
Often, the justifications behind the right of publicity are not compel-
ling, mainly when considering that not only celebrities' interests are at
stake, but other social values, such as freedom of speech, are also at
stake. Madow points out that the decision to recognize a property right
in a celebrity's persona is basically a choice about the allocation of cul-
tural 'meaning-making' power in contemporary society.3 °4 This is a
choice between a centralized, top-down management of popular culture
or a decentralized, open, democratic cultural practice.
Throughout this article we have seen instances where the recognition
of a right of publicity is justified to avoid an exploitation of the celebrity
or a threat to her livelihood. In some other situations, like paraphernalia
or post-mortem rights, it is not always clear what the justification for
publicity rights is. It is in these second kinds of cases where the law
should align itself with cultural pluralism and society's popular culture.
Otherwise, the monopoly of the celebrity will remove symbolic elements
from our cultural commons, which will prevent society from building on
new cultural meanings and social icons. This need is more acute in a
medium like the Internet which realizes, so clearly, the ideals of decen-
tralized, open, democratic meaning-making.
302. For example, it may be unnecessary to constitutionally assure freedom of expression
in an environment which, in the words of EFF co-founder John Gilmore, "treats censorship as
a malfunction" and reroutes proscribed ideas around it. In our real world most nations have
recognized in their constitutions a right to free speech and press, which has been later devel-
oped in more specific legislation or jurisprudence. This legal recognition is not that important
in cyberspace. Attempts to censor on the Internet are quickly routed around thanks to the
networked architecture of the Internet. Technology is sufficent by itself to warrant our free-
dom of speech in cyberspace.
303. Barlow, supra note 71.
304. Madow, supra note 76.
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In the real world, there is a lack of adequate information about the
extent to which publicity rights actually deter popular cultural practice.
There is no question that the right of publicity makes possible the private
censorship of popular meaning-making. It creates an opportunity for ce-
lebrities to suppress disfavored meanings and messages. Some of these
suppressed meanings and messages may not find alternative means of
expression. But, transparency is another virtue of the Internet, from
sites reporting on the Internet actuality (good examples are YAHoo IN-
TERNET LIFE, C/N,.T, WIRED), to the huge archive work made by Civil
Liberty Organizations like ACLU, EFF, EPIC, etc.3°5 In EFF one can
find legal cases or threatening letters sent to some usenet group, urging
them to end their conversations and postings.30 6 Some evidence that the
right of publicity is censoring the free expression of some celebrities'
fans exists. Many of the fans, fearing a law suit, just pull down their on-
line conference. This is suppressed speech that does not find an alterna-
tive means of expression. This type of legal abuse is what the right of
publicity cannot serve. The unsettled legal arena, on the Internet, opens
up the opportunity for individual interests, who try to gain terrain. This
is what needs to be prevented.
C. Where The Courts Stand Right Now
The current trend, in the way in which the cases are being decided,
and in particular, the Vanna White case, has been criticized for placing no
limits on the type of factors that comprise the 'identity' in the common
law right of publicity. "It is not important how the defendant has appro-
priated the plaintiff's identity. A rule which says the right of publicity
can be infringed only through the use of nine different methods of ap-
propriating identity merely challenges the clever advertising strategist to
come up with the tenth."30 7
Strong criticism came from those who thought the decision curtailed
the First Amendment. Some courts, after the Vanna White case, have still
given the First Amendment its important weight when balancing against
the Right of Publicity. In Montana v. San Jose Mercury News, Inc.,30S the
305. These sites can be found at <http://www.aclu.org>, <http://wwv.eff.org>, <http://
www.epic.org>.
306. See for example, letter with reference to the 'Unauthorized Use Of Mighty Morphin
Power Rangers Properties' (visited Dec. 3, 1996) <http://kragar.eff.org/pub/Legal/Cases/
saban~perez.960603_legalthreat.letter>.
307. White, 971 F.2d at 1398.
308. 40 Cal. Reptr. 2d 639, (Cal. App. 6 Dist. 1995), as modified (May 30, 1995), review
denied (Aug.17, 1995).
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court denied football star Joe Montana's claim that a newspaper's use of
his image, taken from its Super Bowl cover story, and sold in poster
form, violated his right of publicity.3 0 9 The court held that the poster
represented newsworthy events, and a newspaper has a constitutional
right to promote itself by reproducing its news stories. 1 In Cardtoons,
LC v. Major League Baseball Player's Association,311 a federal court, in
Denver, exempted from the right of publicity, the production of trading
cards parodying Major League baseball players and their millionaire
contracts.312 In Wendt v. Host International, Inc.,313 the District Court
held that the robotic figures installed at airport bars around the world by
licensees of the television show "Cheers" did not infringe the actors'
right of publicity .314
What can be inferred from these recent cases is that there is a need
for the law to remain adaptable so that it may handle new ways of crea-
tive expression, and thus not be too overprotective and endanger the
freedom to express ideas.
The White opinion, making actionable the evocation of a celeb-
rity's identity in any form, is not the perfect solution for right-of
publicity law, just by assuring that it can be applied effectively to
misappropriation in unprecedented forms. The time may be ripe
for the Supreme Court to take a second look at this issue, consid-
ering over 40 years have passed since Haelan, and almost 20 years
since its first and only pronouncement on the subject.315
D. Proposed Model of Legislation
From the legal analysis of this article, it appears that the existent
legal doctrine of the right of publicity can solve most of the legal issues
that the right might present on-line. This legal doctrine will work as well
on-line but, as a matter of policy there is much that can be done to im-
prove the current statutory and common law regulation.
From an administrative perspective, it would be ideal to have a fed-
eral statute on the right of publicity, comparable to trademark and copy-
right law. Such a law (often discussed but not yet implemented) might be
309. Id.
310. Id.
311. 95 F.3d 959 (10th Cir. 1996).
312. Id.
313. 50 F.3d. 18 (9th Cir., 1995). The USCA 9th has recently reversed and remanded the
case for trial (See Wendt v. Host International Inc., 125 F.3d 806 (9t' Cir. 1997)).
314. Wendt, 125 F.3d 806.
315. Frackman & Bloomfield, supra note 125.
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beneficial in that there is divergence on right-of-publicity issues among
the numerous jurisdictions that recognize the right; e.g., what is and what
is not protected, the differences under common law and statutory law,
whether the right is descendible, and for how long. Moreover, with new-
media technologies choice of law issues may become crucial as the ex-
ploitation of identity can occur easily and quickly at national levels in
ambiguous jurisdictions (e.g., the Internet); a consensus on the law
would promote certainty and reduce forum shopping. Of course, the fed-
eral statute would have to be drafted so that it is relevant in the face of
technological advances and, at the same time, sensitive to free speech
concerns.
This federal act should follow the Copyright Act in terms of time
protection 316 and administration of licensing. It could do this through a
common clearinghouse. 317 An entertainment attorney318 warns of the
high costs of securing rights from celebrities. Usually celebrities are rep-
resented by agents, which make negotiations more time consuming. But,
celebrities tend to have busy schedules which, more often than not, delay
production timing. The result is often a license that will be most
favorable for the celebrity even if certain clauses are included that might
try to commit the celebrity to certain schedules for delivery. This is the
case for celebrities with lots of bargaining power, but not so for the less
famous. It might be even more difficult to get a license in the latter case,
leaving more unprotected the less known talent.
Most courts have determined that the right of publicity protects
something different than copyright, and as such, is not subject to pre-
emption by federal copyright law. Then, it may follow that there is an
inability of the copyright owner to exercise her exclusive right to dis-
tribute. The copyright owner will not be able to sell the work unless she
316. Finally, with the passage of time, an individual's identity is woven into the fabric
of history, as a heroic or obscure character of the past. In that sense, the events and
measure of his life are in the public domain and are questionably placed in the control
of a particular descendant. The fixing of the precise date for the termination of the
right of publicity is inherently a policy decision, one that the Legislature may be best
able to determine. However, in the absence of legislative action, a limit must be pre-
scribed. In fashioning common law rights and remedies in the past, this court has often
considered federal and state statutory schemes for guidance.. .Since the right of public-
ity recognizes an interest in intangible property similar in many respects to creations
protected by copyright law... .that body of law is instructive. (Citations omitted).
Lugos, 603 P.2d at 446.
317. See Jonathan A. Franklin, Article: Digital Image Reproduction, Distribution And Pro-
tection: Legal Remedies And Industrywide Alternatives, 10 COMPUTER & HIGH TEcH. L.J. 347
(1994) (Offering some alternatives to administration of copyright in the digital era.)
318. Raysman & Brown, supra note 133.
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obtains the authorization from the celebrity. Similarly, creations which
are no longer protected by copyright, are sometimes barred from enter-
ing the public domain, as Congress had intended. The right of publicity
makes society wait longer to use those works that fall in the public do-
main. This delay hampers the creative process of society as a whole.
Post-mortem rights should be revised in both cases, with a trend toward
shortening the time of protection (twenty years maximum, should be
enough to cover for the first generation).319
A star should always be able to object to all commercial exploitation
of her image, only those types of fair use and First Amendment pro-
tected uses should be left legally protected. Finally, extra protection may
come as today from other legal bodies (Lanham Act, privacy statutes,
common law rights) and even the aid of technology. For example, au-
thorized endorsements by some celebrity could be easily recognizable by
some sort of digital mark, so that the potential consumer just by clicking
on the add, would see if the star actually recommends the product. The
Internet allows us to adopt a lot of preventive measures through techno-
logical fixes which will eventually reduce the chances of infringement
and also the need for further regulation.
VI. CONCLUSION
The history of the common law right of publicity is not a sound or
consistent one. The traditional justifications for the right (moral ration-
ale, economic rationale, or advertising deception) are not that plausible
when prohibiting uses of the public persona in games, posters, or para-
phernalia that communicate educational or symbolic speech. This speech
is unduly restricted by the celebrity's monopoly on her public image.
In an on-line world, most uses of a celebrity's persona are covered by
the First Amendment right of free speech. The Internet, as the quasi-
perfect realization of the right to free speech, is just an ongoing conver-
sation, where web sites, newsgroups, and the like, are no different than
books, magazines, or chat. They are speech in a digital media and as such
ought to get their way in this open market place, with few permissible
restrictions from the right of publicity. After all, the free market of ideas
constitutes the ground from which so many celebrities emerge. Only
commercial advertising uses and 'look-alikes' or 'sound-alikes,' which
compete with the original should trigger liability on-line the same way as
they do off-line. The trend, though, started by some courts, is to extend
319. See Zacchini, 433 U.S. 562 (1977) (For a short discussion on post-mortem publicity
rights.)
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the blanket of the right over the mere evocation of the celebrity through
surrounding objects, which is too far overreaching in its breadth. Rather,
the perspective as to what the right of publicity aims at promoting must
be kept, that is the commercial value of a person's identity.
The digital age does bring numerous avenues for expression to those
performances by non or less well-known artists. These are the ones that
lack the leverage of a strong negotiating power, when signing contracts,
and thus, they are the ones that call for legislative or judicial protection,
based on their right of publicity. Digital reproduction of an actor's move-
ments, as intrinsic to a person as her face, will need to be covered by the
right of publicity, in order to prevent the unauthorized 'recycling'
through digital animation. The right of publicity upheld by the Supreme
Court in Zacchini, should protect such performance values, which are
intrinsic to a person's identity, rather than protecting surrounding ob-
jects, extrinsic to the human persona, which was done by the Vanna
White Court when it generously characterized these surrounding objects
as part of Vanna's right of publicity.
If one wants to apply the current law, including not only right of pub-
licity but also other legal regulations, to the Internet, it is critical that all
engaged in this task understand the nature of the Internet, the way it
works, and where it is going to. Once this condition is fulfilled, one will
be in a position to solve on-line legal issues by analogy to the existing
case law. The current legal structure itself will be valid on-line but its
application to the Internet will need to be carefully adjusted. One fea-
ture that makes the Internet different from off-line sources, is that it is
guided by the growing case law now available and that the Net is cur-
rently the most enhanced way of communication now available. It is, no
doubt, the best realization of the First Amendment.
The Internet is a medium that resents stringent laws that might have
a chilling effect on the speech. Technological solutions are preferred, if
available. A good instance of this is the use of the sometimes polemic
links. These links are the key to the Infobahn. The link, as words,
images, or sounds, not only conveys info, but is itself the endless path to
more hyperlinked information. The message and the medium merge
themselves into one. Links, as medium-message, work as the digital
"traffic signs" that guide users on their net drive. But, in the information
superhighway, there are other signs, like digital 'billboards,' which have
a blatant commercial purpose, as opposed to the functional one of the
links. No one has a property right to stop others from linking to one's
web site, but one can set up technological barriers to prevent unwanted
visitors. Analogies like this one will be relevant, for example, when dis-
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cerning what constitutes commercial speech - the add banner - from
what is just infotainment - mere links on a web page - in order to
consider First Amendment or fair use protection. These characteriza-
tions of each application in cyberspace and their analogies to real world
entities is where lawyers and the courts must not err. And unless there
are more absurd lawsuits, more unsound court decisions that will impair
the self-development of this medium should not occur.
The Internet, as a digital medium, is rich in technology-based mecha-
nisms to correct dysfunction. Again, before looking to the legislator or
the courts, users ought to look to web specialists who can offer more
efficient and net-friendly solutions. These voluntarily adopted standards
are what speeds up, improves, and enables the growth and increasing
efficiency of the Net. These standards and technical measures are easily
implemented regardless of boundaries, while laws are necessarily at-
tached to some jurisdiction, and thus invalid outside those limits. Society
should try to overcome the fear of the unknown which leads it to ex-
treme measures, like extending the blanket of the law as a prophylactic
measure. Once there is regulation, it is less permissible to step back in
every legal system. Thus, more than any other field, technology calls for
a break from the legislator to step aside until need is imperative.
This article will conclude by emphasizing the validity of the current
laws on the Internet, including the right of publicity, but if and only if,
those in charge of its practice fully understand the digital medium.
Cyberlaw does not mean that a new set of rules are needed for cyber-
space, rather it refers to this new set of premises, that one has to bear in
mind when applying the existing laws to the Internet. The right of public-
ity protects both atoms and bits, analog and digital, subject to the same
off-line limitations as society's constitutional free speech right.
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